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ABSTRACT
This Article examines whether the jurisprudential and institutional
premises of the doctrine of stare decisis retain their validity in the field
of foreign affairs. The proper role of the judicial branch in foreign
affairs has provoked substantial scholarly debate—historical,
institutional, and normative—since the founding of the Republic.
Precisely because of the sensitivity of the subject, the Supreme Court
has both warned about the judicial branch’s comparative lack of
expertise in the field and established a web of deference doctrines
designed to protect against improvident judicial action.
Notwithstanding all of this discussion, however, neither the Supreme
Court nor any scholar has ever examined the complicated relationship
between stare decisis and foreign affairs.
This Article first contextualizes the discussion with an analysis of
the foundations of stare decisis. After a review of the values that
animate the doctrine, it explores the subtly important jurisdictional
premises of stare decisis. Almost entirely overlooked by both courts
and scholars, these inherent jurisdictional limitations on the force of
precedent have direct implications for the proper role of stare decisis
in foreign affairs law. The Article then examines the special
constitutional arrangement of powers in the field, in particular the
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respective roles of Congress and the executive. Just as significant, the
Article also canvasses the multiplicity of avenues by which the
American legal system channels foreign affairs issues to the federal
courts. This growing interbranch tension highlights the significance of
reflexively cloaking the resultant judicial precedents with full stare
decisis effect.
The analysis in this Article demonstrates that in fact a more
nuanced and accommodating understanding of precedent is required
with respect to certain fundamental aspects of foreign affairs law. For
purely domestic statutes, fidelity to the value judgments first made by
Congress within and for the domestic legal system should avoid both
the fact and appearance of independent judicial agency. Moreover,
when Congress takes it upon itself to define the entire content of the
law—without importing international legal norms—the courts need
look only to familiar domestic sources and materials in their
interpretive inquiries.
Matters are different, however, for the broad and expanding field
of controversies that likewise fall within the Article III “judicial
Power” but that involve the courts in the enforcement of rights or
obligations grounded in international law. Within this field, the
analysis in this Article demonstrates that the likelihood and
consequences of judicial error are greater, that precedents are
particularly susceptible to rapid erosion by exogenous forces of
change, and that institutional considerations make judicial leadership
that has been fortified by rigid precedent particularly problematic. It
ultimately concludes that these distinct considerations should function
as an additional “special justification” for reexamining internationallaw precedents. Consistent with the systemic values of stare decisis,
however, the reexamination power should exist only for the issuing
court; lower courts in the hierarchically integrated judicial branch—
courts that are subject to the vertical dimension of stare decisis—
should remain bound by precedents to the full extent of existing law.
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INTRODUCTION
Stare decisis and the law of foreign affairs seem to inhabit
entirely different jurisprudential worlds with no apparent means of
communication. In matters of foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has
often warned about the judicial branch’s comparative lack of
expertise and inability to gauge the implications of its judgments for
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external relations. Separately, a web of deference doctrines and
related interpretive presumptions function to protect against
improvident judicial detours into foreign affairs, especially on matters
2
of international law. Together, these related considerations
constitute admonitions to the courts about the unfamiliarity of the
terrain and the consequent risks of judicial leadership in the field.
Curiously, however, these concerns seemingly evaporate once a
court creates a precedent. An analysis of stare decisis jurisprudence
fails to uncover any sensitivity to the special risks and “collateral
3
consequences” of judicial error in foreign affairs matters. That is, ex
ante admonitions about improvident judicial action do not find even
the faintest echo in the stare decisis force of judicial precedents ex
post. My goal here is to mine this curiosity.
The proper role of the judicial branch in foreign affairs has
provoked substantial scholarly debate—historical, institutional, and
4
normative—since the founding of the Republic. In all of this

1. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (observing
that “when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [national security
and foreign affairs], ‘the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked’” (quoting
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981))); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 386 (2000) (“We have . . . recognized the limits of our own capacity to ‘determin[e]
precisely when foreign nations will be offended by particular acts.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983))); Chi. & S. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (declaring that decisions in foreign
affairs are “delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy . . . . of a kind for which
the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility”); infra notes 138–52 and
accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (declaring that the executive
branch’s views on the interpretation of treaties are entitled to “great weight”); Medellín v.
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1361 (2008) (same); infra notes 194–96, 340–45 and accompanying text.
3. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28 (2004) (emphasizing the “collateral
consequences” of recognizing domestically enforceable torts for violations of international law).
4. For an introduction to the voluminous scholarship on the propriety of judicial
deference to the political branches in foreign affairs, see generally THOMAS M. FRANCK,
POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN
AFFAIRS? (1992); Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976); and Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1450 (2006). Relatedly, few issues have excited as many scholarly debates as the power of
federal courts to apply international law on their own initiative. See generally Anthony J. Bellia,
Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2009);
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L.
Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); Lea Brilmayer, International Law in
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
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discussion, however, the relationship between foreign affairs and
5
stare decisis has been met with little comment and no detailed
analysis. Similarly, the Supreme Court has never seriously examined
whether the prudential and institutional premises of stare decisis
retain their validity in the field of foreign affairs, even for precedents
that define the United States’ sovereign obligations under
6
international law. Indeed, aside from including marginal notes in a
7
pair of dissents, the Court missed two prime opportunities to opine
8
on the subject in the opening years of the twenty-first century.
The analysis in this Article demonstrates that a more nuanced
understanding of precedent is appropriate with respect to certain
fundamental aspects of foreign affairs law. Judicial rulings on the
Constitution’s allocation of powers in the field are already subject to
9
a less rigorous version of stare decisis. In light of the practical
impossibility of correction by the political branches, sound reasons

5. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (2006) (observing that
“interstitial uses of international law” by the judiciary “are subject to subsequent legislative
overruling, but [that] courts also can choose to abandon them on their own initiative in the face
of reflection and experience”); Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 98, 106 (Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon &
William D. Rogers eds., 1990) (suggesting that stare decisis need not require “that rules of
decision regarding international law in U.S. court cases are binding in all later cases”); Harlan
G. Cohen, Undead Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of History, 84 TUL. L. REV.
957, 990–95 (2010) (analyzing the historical significance of precedents in the shadow of World
War II); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 486
(2003) (noting briefly that the difficulty of override by the political branches might justify a
weakened form of stare decisis for international-law precedents).
6. Other than in cases considering constitutional allocations of power, the Supreme Court
has rarely even paused to mention the force of precedent in cases with implications for foreign
affairs. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516 (1947) (refusing to revisit a treaty precedent
because of consistent judicial interpretation over time and because of the plain language of the
treaty); The Adula, 176 U.S. 361, 371 (1900) (refusing to overrule an international-law
precedent simply “to conform to the opinions of foreign writers as to what they suppose to be
the existing law upon the subject”); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
(acknowledging the possibility of a “controlling . . . judicial decision” on international law);
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 22 (1899) (concluding that the subsequent practical construction of
a treaty by the executive branch was not so compelling as to “warrant the court in overruling its
own opinions” on the matter).
7. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 389–90 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 689 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also infra note 248
and accompanying text.
8. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331; infra notes
244–52 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
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support this outcome. The special concern in this Article is instead
the broad and expanding swath of controversies that likewise fall
11
within the Article III “judicial Power” but that involve the courts in
the identification of rights or obligations under international law.
Inquiries into such matters, by their nature, inject the judicial branch
into the uncharacteristic position of leadership in defining the very
content of the nation’s formal legal relations with foreign states. My
analysis demonstrates, moreover, that even the basic premises of
stare decisis become unreliable, and in some respects fail to obtain at
all, when courts create precedents on such matters.
In contrast, foreign-policy implications should not compromise
the foundations of stare decisis for purely domestic statutes. When
Congress takes it upon itself to define the entire content of the law—
without importing international norms—the relationship between
lawmaker and law applier is solely an internal, domestic affair. To be
sure, congressional statutes, and thus judicial interpretations of them,
12
may have consequences for foreign relations. But fidelity to the
value judgments first made by Congress within its constitutionally
delegated authority should mitigate any concerns about independent
judicial agency in foreign affairs lawmaking. Standard approaches to
precedent founded on standard institutional relationships remain
13
appropriate here.
To establish the context for an analysis of these points, Part I
first reviews the jurisprudential and institutional foundations of stare
decisis. The force of a given precedent ultimately hinges on weighing
the systemic values of stability, predictability, and judicial legitimacy
against a set of situation-specific “antivalues” that focus on the
precedent’s original and continuing validity. But as I show in Part I,
the notion of adherence to precedent is also animated by an
appreciation of the respective constitutional stations of the judicial
branch and Congress. That Part then explores the subtly important
jurisdictional premises of stare decisis. Almost entirely overlooked by
courts and scholars, these inherent jurisdictional limitations on the

10. See infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
12. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
13. See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

STARE DECISIS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

947

force of precedent have direct implications for the proper place of
stare decisis in matters of international law.
The Constitution’s special arrangement of authority over foreign
affairs is the subject of the analysis in Part II. In this field as well,
Congress remains the preeminent domestic lawmaker. But in its text
and structure, the Constitution also allocates special responsibilities
to the executive in managing the nation’s relations with foreign states.
This enhanced executive authority provides the backdrop for the web
of admonitions about the risks of untutored judicial action in foreign
affairs. The friction arises, however, from the expanding mandate of
the courts to participate in the definition of rights and obligations
under international law. To highlight the significance of this growing
interbranch tension, Part II canvasses the multiplicity of avenues—
treaties,
“treaty-statutes,”
delegated
lawmaking
authority,
14
“international law cum common law,” executive agreements, and
metanorms of interpretation—through which the American legal
system now channels such matters to the courts.
This all provides the foundation for an examination in Part III of
the proper relationship between the Article III “judicial Power” in
foreign affairs and the doctrine of stare decisis. That Part first
explains why judicial enforcement of international law differs as a
matter of kind, not merely of degree, from the application of law of a
purely domestic origin. The necessary consequence of precedent in
foreign matters is the definition of rights or obligations that govern
the nation’s legal relations with foreign states. Indeed, one might view
15
international law as the “hardest” form of foreign relations law. The
gravity of this responsibility, properly appreciated, should alone give
courts pause before reflexively cloaking foreign affairs precedents
with full stare decisis effect.
Careful analysis reveals that the values that animate stare decisis
become unstable when courts create precedents founded on
international law. Even when legal norms have been validated by
domestic authorities, their origin—the source from which they derive
their content—remains the international legal system. And in contrast
to the mechanisms for interpreting purely domestic statutes, the only
14. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (coining this term to describe
federal common law derived from customary international law).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1 (1987) (stating that the foreign-relations law of the United States consists of both
domestic law that has substantial effects on foreign relations and “international law as it applies
to the United States”).
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mechanism for the interpretation and clarification of international
law is a multipolar system of judicial cooperation that entirely lacks
hierarchical integration.
As a result, the factual and doctrinal premises of a “final”
decision on an international-law norm, even a decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court, may be subject to almost immediate destabilization
in the same legal system from which the norm emerged and in which
it continues to operate. As Part III.B explores, this international legal
structure again contrasts with standard congressional statutes. Unlike
in the domestic realm, the disaggregated process of the interpretation
and enforcement of international law creates substantial forces of
judicial change exogenous to the domestic system and thus beyond
the control of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the cultural, legal,
linguistic, and related differences among international lawmakers
greatly increase the risk of judicial error from the outset. These
16
uncertainties combine to compromise the “calm” that stare decisis is
designed to secure and reinforce.
Consider as an illustration of this point the Supreme Court’s
series of cases on the domestic enforcement of certain individual
17
rights protected by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
In two initial decisions, the Court expressly determined that protected
individuals could waive their treaty rights under domestic procedural
18
rules. Although definitive as a matter of domestic stare decisis, these
decisions could not control even immediate developments under
international law. Within only a few years, the International Court of
19
Justice (ICJ) had interpreted the treaty in a directly contrary way
and had then ordered the United States to take certain remedial

16. The term “stare decisis” derives from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere—that is, “stand by the precedents and do not disturb the calm.” John Paul Stevens, The
Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 & n.2 (1983) (quoting Stanley Reed,
Address, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law, 9 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 131, 131 (1938)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
18. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1999) (per
curiam) (holding that because the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity,
Germany could not prevent Arizona’s execution of a German prisoner); Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 375–76 (1998) (per curiam) (“Claims not [raised in state court] are considered
defaulted. By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court, Breard failed to exercise
his rights under the Vienna Convention . . . .” (citation omitted)).
19. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 61, 63 (Mar.
31) (stating that detaining authorities must respect the treaty rights of foreign nationals).
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20

actions on behalf of affected individuals. The ICJ authoritatively
rejected the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the internationaltreaty obligations of the United States. Unfortunately, however, in
two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refused to give effect to the
ICJ’s interpretation and thereby failed to recognize the inability of
domestic stare decisis to create “calm” with respect to matters of
21
international law.
An institutional perspective on stare decisis also supports a more
accommodating understanding of the proper force of internationallaw precedents. The enforcement of norms derived from international
law, as I explain in Part III.C, involves a kind of problematic judicial
discretion, and thus judicial leadership, that differs in essence from
the application of purely domestic law. I then confront the most
obvious and significant institutional counterargument: the availability
of congressional override. Congress may well have the power to
overturn a judicial precedent founded on international law, and
22
perhaps even a precedent founded on the interpretation of treaties.
Nonetheless, this formal argument ultimately is based upon a legally
suspect and factually unrealistic inversion of the Constitution’s
prescribed lawmaking sequence—Congress creates, the courts
apply—for law Congress did not even create in the first place. Part III
then concludes with an analysis of the proper means of calibrating
stare decisis with the special responsibilities of the executive in
foreign affairs.
The final Part distills the various themes into a summary analysis.
I conclude that extant stare decisis norms remain appropriate for
purely domestic statutes and regulations, even those that affect
foreign affairs. My conclusions are different, however, for the judicial
enforcement of international law. To be sure, even in that arena, the
systemic and institutional values of stare decisis justify a prima facie
respect for precedent. But the analysis in Part IV demonstrates that

20. See id. ¶¶ 121–23, 138–43, 153(9) (finding “that the appropriate reparation in this case
consists in the obligation of the United States of America to provide . . . review and
reconsideration of the convictions and sentences” of the affected individuals).
21. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358 (2008) (concluding that domestic courts are
not bound by ICJ decisions); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352–60 (2006) (“Nothing
in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be
conclusive on our courts.” (footnote omitted)). For a more detailed analysis of this example, see
infra notes 246–50 and accompanying text.
22. Indeed, in response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), Congress purported
to do just that. See infra notes 311–13.
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the distinctive considerations that attend judicial action involving
international law should function as a significant weight on the
23
scale—that is, as an additional “special justification” for revisiting
the original and continuing validity of a precedent. Enhanced
modesty of this type should strengthen the institutional position of
the judiciary, for it would permit, but not require, the reexamination
of a precedent as an alternative to routine ex ante acquiescence to the
executive branch’s policy preferences.
The argument for increased flexibility toward international-law
precedents is especially compelling for the federal courts of appeals.
As they do for most matters, these regional courts create the vast
24
bulk of precedents on international law. Because of this reality, I
address their particularly misguided, and nearly rigid, stare decisis
practices in a separate section at the end of Part IV.
Over the years, an aphorism from Justice Brandeis has become a
darling of stare decisis enthusiasts. “[I]n most matters,” he declared,
“it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
25
that it be settled right.” The analysis in this Article strongly suggests,
however, that the significant and sensitive subject of our nation’s
international legal relations is not one of those routine “most
matters.” In any event, neither of Justice Brandeis’s alternative
propositions fully holds for disputed issues in the field of foreign
affairs. The special circumstances in that field decrease substantially
the likelihood that a first judicial impression actually will settle the
matter or that it will be right in the first place.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF STARE DECISIS
A. Understanding the Notion of Precedent
For the common-law mind steeped in the tradition of progressive
advancement on a foundation of progressively refined reason, there is

23. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (explaining that
departure from precedent requires a “special justification”); infra notes 55–57 and
accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 384–85.
25. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). For endorsements of
Justice Brandeis’s statement by the Supreme Court, see, for example, John R. Sand & Gravel
Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 757 (2008); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997);
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); and New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572, 590 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

STARE DECISIS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

951

a self-evident quality to the notion of precedent. Precedent appeals to
primal desires for—and, in a system of laws, justified expectations
26
of—rationality, regularity, and stability. Indeed, Justice Cardozo’s
famous metaphor that judges merely “lay [their] own course of bricks
27
on the secure foundation of the courses” of their forebears is now so
28
ingrained in common-law thinking as to seem almost trite.
But stare decisis also marches in service of loftier causes.
Stripped to its essence, the concept of binding precedent is a self29
imposed rule-of-law norm for the judiciary. That is, by constraining
situational discretion, stare decisis reflects the proposition that
objectively determined rules of law are binding on an independently
constituted judicial branch. Stare decisis might even be a
jurisprudential imperative. As Justice Breyer confidently declared in
30
Randall v. Sorrell, “[T]he rule of law demands that adhering to our
31
prior case law be the norm.”
Self-evident propositions can be tricky things, however. The
Constitution nowhere expressly empowers the federal judiciary to
endow its own opinions with a legal force that binds subsequent
courts. Since the Court’s landmark holding in Erie Railroad Co. v.
32
Tompkins, moreover, “[f]ederal courts . . . [have] not possess[ed] a
33
general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision.”
Stare decisis butts up against this principle as one approaches the
26. See infra notes 41–54 and accompanying text.
27. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921).
28. Justice Stevens has been a particular fan of this quotation. See, e.g., District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2824 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2470 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695,
711 (1995) (Stevens, J.).
29. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (“[I]t is indisputable
that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch . . . .”), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Jones v.
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 752 (1988) (“A general judicial adherence
to constitutional precedent supports a consensus about the rule of law, specifically the belief
that all organs of government, including the Court, are bound by the law.”).
30. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
31. Id. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution
requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”).
32. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts.”).
33. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981).
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more absolute edges of the notion of adherence to precedent. No
matter how faithful a court may be in discerning the law established
by others, communication across time, institutions, and circumstances
inevitably involves uncertainty and, thus, choice. The power to
interpret, in short, is infected with the temptation, and sometimes the
need, to create. A version of stare decisis that would consecrate every
legal ruling with unyielding permanence thus would transform judicial
interpreters into lawmakers in every sense but name.
It should not be surprising, then, that the Supreme Court founds
its modern canon of stare decisis not on constitutional compulsions or
even powers but rather on prudential impulses anchored, as I have
34
suggested, in the rule of law. As is so often the case with this
doctrine, the Court has a quotation of ancient lineage ready-made for
any serious discussion of the issue: “[I]t is common wisdom,” the
Court has frequently observed, “that the rule of stare decisis is not an
35
‘inexorable command.’” It is, rather, “a principle of policy and not a
36
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”
The word “policy” here, however, carries a serious risk of
misdirection. To some skeptics, the absence of any absolute formula

34. See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 243–44 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (“The Court has pointed
out that stare decisis ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ Stare decisis thereby avoids the instability and
unfairness that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations. For this reason, the rule of
law demands that adhering to our prior case law be the norm.” (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556–57 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“Stare decisis
is not an ‘inexorable command,’ but the doctrine is ‘of fundamental importance to the rule of
law.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior
holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of
the rule of law . . . .”); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (“Time and
time again, this Court has recognized that ‘the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental
importance to the rule of law.’ Adherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and
respect for judicial authority.” (citations omitted) (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (plurality opinion))); Welch, 483 U.S. at 478–79 (“The
rule of law depends in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis.”).
35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see
also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command . . . .” (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)) (internal quotation
mark omitted)); Harris, 536 U.S. at 556 (“Stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command . . . .’”
(quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
36. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
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has served merely to open the gates for selective manipulation to suit
37
judges’ subjective predilections. But the Supreme Court “[t]ime and
time again” has emphasized the “fundamental importance” of stare
38
decisis for the rule of law in our case-based system. And as I
demonstrate in Section B, this observation has teeth, for departure
39
from precedent is considered an “exceptional” move allowable only
40
pursuant to a “compelling” justification.
B. The Values that Animate Stare Decisis
The notion that judges should adhere to authoritative decisions
41
of the past has a deep lineage in America’s common-law heritage.
After two hundred years of domestic judicial pronouncements on the
42
subject, legal scholars have had ample source material for
43
examinations of the foundations of stare decisis. Thus, although a

37. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 404 (1988) (“The doctrine of stare decisis . . . is
inherently subjective, and few judges, including Supreme Court Justices, can resist the natural
temptation to manipulate it.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute:
May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1598
(2000) (“The Supreme Court’s practice today is plainly one of selective stare decisis in the first
place. Precedent is followed, except when it isn’t.”).
38. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (quoting Welch, 483 U.S. at 494); see also Randall, 548 U.S. at
243–44 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (citing numerous cases that emphasize the importance of stare
decisis).
39. Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
40. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202; see also infra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
41. The famous Commentaries by James Kent in 1826 traced the notion of precedent to
judicial practice during the reign of Edward III in the fourteenth century. See 1 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *476–77 (O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 12th ed. 1873) (1826) (“[F]rom the reign of Edward III. to that of Henry VII., the judges
were incessantly urging the sacredness of precedents, and that a counsellor was not to be heard
who spoke against them, and that they ought to judge as the ancient sages taught.”).
42. For an historical review of American practice, see generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare
Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 647 (1999).
43. See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1173 (2006) (discussing the pragmatic arguments for stare decisis and the relationship
between originalism and stare decisis); Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing
Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107 (1995) (analyzing the role of stare decisis in the Court’s effort
to appear principled); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 411 (2010) (aiming “to isolate the various components of the Supreme Court’s stare decisis
jurisprudence and to study their individual and collective functions”); Lee, supra note 42
(tracking “the primary aspects of the Rehnquist Court’s doctrine of stare decisis from foundingera commentary to [its] origins in decisions of the Supreme Court”); Paulsen, supra note 37
(examining “whether Congress may abrogate stare decisis in a particular class of constitutional
cases (or in federal question cases generally)”).
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careful appreciation of the values that animate stare decisis is
essential for my subsequent analysis of the proper role of the doctrine
in the field of foreign affairs, a brief review will suffice here.
The Supreme Court itself settled some time ago on a customary
formulation for the justification of stare decisis. According to the
Court, the doctrine “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
44
consistent development of legal principles.” Adherence to precedent
likewise “fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the
45
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” When
considered carefully, these broad values coalesce into three essential,
46
interrelated categories: stability, predictability, and legitimacy.
The most recognizable value of stare decisis is its ability to
enhance stability and consistency across time and similar
47
circumstances. At its most elemental level, it satisfies the impulse
that, all other things being equal, a legal system is better advised to
resolve matters firmly and finally than to search for normatively more
48
appealing solutions on a case-by-case basis. In the same vein,
adherence to precedent fosters the orderly and efficient
administration of justice by discouraging successive relitigation of
49
issues that have already been authoritatively resolved.
Stability functions in tandem with predictability. Adherence to
precedent establishes a framework for efficient public and private
44. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 827 (1991)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light
Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (plurality opinion) (noting that stare decisis “serves the broader
societal interests in evenhanded, consistent, and predictable application of legal rules”).
45. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (quoting United
States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)) (internal quotation mark omitted);
see also Hilton, 502 U.S.at 202 (“Adherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and
respect for judicial authority.”).
46. For articles discussing this taxonomy, see Hellman, supra note 43, at 1109–11; and Lee,
supra note 42, at 652–53.
47. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (observing that
“legal stability” is the goal of “[p]rinciples of stare decisis”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
577 (2003) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is essential . . . to the stability of the law.”); supra note
44.
48. This point, of course, is the thrust of the Justice Brandeis aphorism quoted in the
Introduction. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
49. The standard, almost obligatory, quotation supporting this proposition comes from
Justice Cardozo. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403–04 (1970)
(declaring that stare decisis advances the interest of “fair and expeditious adjudication by
eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case”); see also CARDOZO,
supra note 27, at 149 (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if
every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”).
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50

planning. The resulting reliance interests, in turn, make out a
51
compelling claim for legal protection. Not surprisingly, this
reasoning is particularly germane with respect to principles
52
reaffirmed by “iteration and reiteration over a long period of time.”
Finally, stare decisis serves to sustain the public’s trust in a
principled, law-bound judiciary. In other words, adherence to
precedent reinforces both the fact and the perception that in
America’s constitutional system, federal courts fundamentally are not
lawmakers; their role, rather, is to identify and apply the objective
53
rules of law that have been generated by the political branches. In
the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, stare decisis “permits society
to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than
54
in the proclivities of individuals.”
C. The Stare Decisis Antivalues: The Justifications for Reexamining
Precedent
Under the combined weight of these considerations, the doctrine
of stare decisis ultimately functions as a strong presumption against
revisiting precedent. The Supreme Court has described this
presumption in a variety of ways, but the basic thrust has been the
same: stare decisis imposes a “severe burden” on those judges who

50. See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (“Stare decisis . . . avoids the
instability and unfairness that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations.”); Hilton, 502
U.S. at 202 (observing that “[a]dherence to precedent promotes stability [and] predictability”);
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 812–15 (2002)
(observing that the certainty enhanced by adherence to precedent creates a “framework for less
costly, more accurate, and thus more effective planning for future activity”).
51. The cases in which the Supreme Court has emphasized this point are legion. See, e.g.,
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2007) (“[R]eliance on
a judicial opinion is a significant reason to adhere to it . . . .”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding . . . . we may
ask . . . whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling . . . .”). This principle is especially forceful in property and
commercial matters. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56 (observing that “the classic case for weighing
reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the commercial context”); Payne,
501 U.S. at 828 (declaring that “stare decisis [is] at [its] acme in cases involving property and
contract rights”).
52. Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
53. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 865–66 (examining in detail the role stare decisis plays in
advancing the legitimacy of the judicial branch); Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (declaring that stare
decisis “contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process”). For a broader
analysis of this factor, see Hellman, supra note 43, at 1112, 1115–20.
54. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
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are dissatisfied with established case law. Disavowal of precedent
56
thus is “exceptional” and requires, as the Court has observed, “the
57
most convincing of reasons.”
Nevertheless, the doctrine is one of prudence and pragmatism.
Even supreme courts are fallible. To avoid both ossification in the law
and unthinking adherence to past mistakes, a rational doctrine of
precedent must leave some room for reconsideration. To this end, the
Supreme Court has recognized what can be seen as a set of stare
decisis antivalues, which balance the system by permitting the review
and correction of conspicuous judicial misfires of the past.
Although the grounds for overruling precedent are easily stated,
their application is necessarily highly specific to each particular
situation. One standard consideration is whether a precedent has
58
proved to be “unworkable” in practice. On a similar note,
reconsideration is appropriate when an earlier decision is seen as
poorly reasoned from the outset or otherwise “has been the subject of
59
continuing controversy and confusion.” When carefully considered,
each of these related ideas is simply another way of saying that a
particular precedent never succeeded in establishing the stability and
predictability that justify stare decisis in the first place.
An even more significant consideration has been the influence of
subsequent developments on the foundation of a precedent.
Reevaluation of a precedent is justified when “facts have so changed,
or [have] come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old
60
rule of significant application or justification.” “Of most relevance,”

55. Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“The
doctrine of stare decisis imposes a severe burden on the litigant who asks us to disavow one of
our precedents.”).
56. Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
57. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010); see also, e.g., Hilton v. S.C. Pub.
Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (“[W]e will not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis
without some compelling justification.”).
58. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088 (2009) (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (stating that overruling
might be justified when a decision “has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability”).
59. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977); see also Montejo, 129 S.
Ct. at 2088–89 (“Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the
principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake,
and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.”).
60. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55 (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817 (2009)
(relying on “a considerable body of new experience” to overrule a precedent); Randall, 548 U.S.
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however, has been the effect of intervening developments in the law
61
itself. The “primary reason” for overruling precedent, the Supreme
Court has declared, is that “either the growth of judicial doctrine or
further action taken by Congress . . . . ha[s] removed or weakened the
62
conceptual underpinnings from [a] prior decision.” Thus, for
example, in the 2007 case of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
63
PSKS, Inc., the Court chronicled nearly one hundred years of
corrosive case-law developments to justify overruling an established
64
precedent on the per se invalidity of vertical price restraints.
D. Institutional and Instrumental Considerations
A further fixture of stare decisis jurisprudence is perhaps the
most important for understanding the doctrine in application. The
Supreme Court has long held that stare decisis is most potent in
65
statutory cases and is weakest in constitutional cases. At its most

at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (declining to overrule a precedent because of the absence of a
showing “that circumstances ha[d] changed so radically as to undermine [its] critical factual
assumptions”).
61. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007) (“Of
most relevance, ‘we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined
their doctrinal underpinnings.’” (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000))).
62. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Jones v. R.R.
Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521
(1995) (declaring that stare decisis may yield when a precedent’s “underpinnings [have been]
eroded, by subsequent decisions of [the] Court”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55 (observing that
review of a precedent might be justified when “related principles of law have so far developed
as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”).
63. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
64. See id. at 2710 (overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911), which “established the rule that it is per se illegal under [federal antitrust law] for a
manufacturer to agree with its distributor to set the minimum price the distributor can charge
for the manufacturer’s goods”).
65. See, e.g., Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816–17 (“[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily
in the area of statutory construction . . . .” (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736
(1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S.
Ct. 750, 756–57 (2008) (“[S]tare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has ‘special
force’ . . . .” (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73)); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, . . . Congress remains free to alter
what we have done.”). Some leading scholars have criticized this established Supreme Court
jurisprudence. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J.
1361, 1398–1409 (1988) (arguing against a heightened form of stare decisis for statutory cases);
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 40–54 (1988)
(advancing a similar critique). At the other end of the spectrum, some critics have questioned
the propriety of weakened stare decisis in constitutional cases. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
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elemental level, this distinction is grounded in the availability—both
formally and practically—of alternative constitutional vehicles for
error correction. Stated simply, when a court interprets a statute, the
legislative branch is available to correct, update, or otherwise revise
the judicial determination. Thus, as the Supreme Court has reiterated,
“considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s
66
interpretation of its legislation.” So potent is this principle that
Justice Scalia has described it as an “almost categorical rule of stare
67
decisis in statutory cases.”
The institutional landscape is quite different in constitutional
cases. When the Supreme Court grounds a decision in the
Constitution, the only vehicles for revision or adaptation are the
68
Court itself and the amendment procedure of Article V. Precisely
because correction through the latter option “is practically
69
70
impossible,” stare decisis in constitutional cases “is at its weakest.”
Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared that constitutional
precedents in foreign affairs matters in particular “afford little
71
precedential value for subsequent cases.” To be sure, here as well
Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 429–33 (1988) (“I want
to kick sand on the shibboleth that it should be easier to overrule a constitutional decision than
a statutory or common law decision.”); Monaghan, supra note 29, at 741–42 (noting that the
main argument in favor of a weak constitutional stare decisis is that “correction through
legislative action is practically impossible” but asserting that “the argnment’s [sic] central factual
premise is overdrawn” (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406–07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
66. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816–17 (quoting Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 736) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 756–57 (making a similar observation).
For a broad analysis of this issue, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
67. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 493 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Eskridge, supra
note 65, at 1363–69 (reviewing critically the Supreme Court’s “super-strong presumption against
overruling statutory precedents”).
68. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the amendment procedure).
69. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 828 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). History abundantly proves the point. What
Justice Brandeis observed in 1932 continues to ring true: “In only two instances—the Eleventh
and the Sixteenth Amendments—has the process of constitutional amendment been successfully
resorted to, to nullify decisions of this Court.” Burnet, 285 U.S. at 409 n.5 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
70. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (“Stare
decisis is not an inexorable command . . . . This is particularly true in constitutional cases,
because in such cases ‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.’” (quoting
Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
71. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981).
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72

the requirement of special justification remains. Nonetheless, it is
not uncommon for the Court to revisit even recent constitutional
73
precedents, as its controversial decision in Citizens United v. FEC
74
demonstrated.
The justification for differential application of stare decisis runs
deeper, however, than the mere fact that expedient, nonjudicial
sources of error correction are more readily available in cases of
statutory interpretation than in cases of constitutional interpretation.
Rather, the distinction finds essential color and texture in the courts’
respect for the distinct constitutional allocations of authority to—and,
presumably, the derivative institutional competences of—the judicial
branch and Congress. The doctrine is thus animated not only by
which institution is, but also by which institution should be, the
principal source of continued development in a given field of law.
When a court interprets a statute, it operates against the
backdrop of the legislative competence of Congress acting within its
constitutionally founded lawmaking powers. The special force of stare
decisis in statutory cases recognizes the primacy of Congress in
Article I lawmaking by deferring to the original lawmakers for
correction, adjustment, or modernization of their own legislative
products. As the Supreme Court thus observed in Neal v. United
75
States, “Our reluctance to overturn [statutory] precedents derives in
part from institutional concerns about the relationship of the
Judiciary to Congress. . . . Congress, not this Court, has the
76
responsibility for revising its statutes.”
In constitutional matters, by contrast, the Supreme Court “bears
the ultimate obligation for the development of the law as institutions
72. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“Even in
constitutional cases, in which stare decisis concerns are less pronounced, we will not overrule a
precedent absent a ‘special justification.’” (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212
(1984))).
73. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
74. See id. at 911–12 (overruling in part McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
75. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
76. Id. at 295–96; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is
implicated . . . .”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); Lawrence C.
Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88
MICH. L. REV. 177, 208–15 (1989) (exploring a “heightened or absolute rule of statutory stare
decisis”).
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develop.” In other words, in a tradition derived from no less than
78
Marbury v. Madison, the Court has assigned itself ultimate authority
79
over the meaning of the Constitution. The judicial branch, therefore,
is the institution with the independence and expertise to review—and,
as appropriate, to correct and update—prior constitutional
precedents.
The role of these institutional considerations in relation to the
80
rare subject of federal common law is unclear. Lacking guidance
from the Supreme Court, some scholars assume that common-law
81
decisions enjoy a “normal” level of precedential force. Others take
the view, in contrast, that the strong version of stare decisis for
82
statutory decisions should apply to common-law precedents as well.
This matter, of course, will return to significance in my later review of
83
“international law cum common law.” It suffices at this point to
observe that the Supreme Court seemingly has endorsed a more
relaxed version of the doctrine of stare decisis when courts take the
lead in developing the law based on a corresponding delegation of
84
authority from Congress.
E. The Unexamined Boundaries of Stare Decisis
Finally, inherent in the doctrine of binding precedent is a
principle that courts and scholars have almost entirely overlooked:
stare decisis is inseparably bound up in, and constrained by, the
concept of jurisdiction. As I explain, I use the term “jurisdiction” in
its essential sense of the realm of authority within which a court has
the power to declare the law. Alexander Hamilton once aptly parsed

77. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221 (1961).
78. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
79. See id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”).
80. See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 67, at 1366 (“Presumably, common law precedents would
continue to enjoy the normal stare decisis presumption.”); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent,
66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 388 (1988) (“Common-law precedents provide the benchmark against
which other case law is measured.”).
82. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 76, at 222 (arguing that the separation-of-power concerns
that support “an absolute rule of stare decisis in statutory cases” apply to federal common-law
precedents as well); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of
Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between ‘common law’ and
‘statutory interpretation’ is a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind.”).
83. See infra notes 177–86 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 377–78 and accompanying text.
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the concept in the same way. “[J]urisdiction,” he observed, “is
composed of JUS and DICTO, juris, dictio, or a speaking or
85
pronouncing of the law.”
Courts of law derive their power to issue authoritative rulings
from a particular polity. They are, in the first instance, legally
86
constituted by such a polity. At a more immediate and concrete
level, this foundational source of power also defines whether a court
has adjudicative authority—in American legal idioms, subject-matter
87
and personal jurisdiction—over a particular dispute. When so
constituted and when within their legal mandate, courts exercise a
distinct function on behalf of their state: in Montesquieu’s famous
88
allocation, the “power of judging” over individual controversies. It is
thus not by accident that the Constitution vests “the judicial Power of
the United States” in the Supreme Court and “in such inferior courts
89
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”
Woven into this notion of judicial power is the authority to
resolve disputed issues of law in a binding and—for the common-law
90
mind at least —final manner. This authority exists, however, only
within the framework of the legal system from which the declaring
court has derived its mandate. Although tautological, one may find
insight in the observation that a court has the power to create
precedent only within the legal system for which it has the power to
speak with finality. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for
example, could no more make binding pronouncements for New
York courts on the law of New York than the legislature of

85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 489 & n.* (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
86. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing “one supreme Court” and empowering
Congress to establish inferior federal courts).
87. In international law, this concept is captured by the term “jurisdiction to adjudicate.”
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401(b) (1987) (“Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on . . . jurisdiction to
adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative
tribunals . . . .”).
88. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller
& Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (recognizing a
“power of judging” that is distinct from the legislative power and executive powers).
89. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
90. As noted in Part III.B.1, the formal concept of stare decisis does not apply in civil-law
systems. See infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
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Massachusetts could validly empower this highest court of
91
Massachusetts to do so in the first place.
In the federal realm, the Constitution itself recognizes this
principle with a simple, but subtly powerful, two-letter preposition: it
vests in the federal Supreme Court “the judicial Power of the United
92
States”—not, for example, “in” the United States. For this reason,
even the Supreme Court lacks the authority to create precedent
concerning the law of a state that is binding on the internal organs of
93
that state.
Courts and scholars alike have almost entirely overlooked this
essential jurisdictional premise of stare decisis. Nonetheless, a careful
focus on this embedded limitation affords important insights into the
values that animate the doctrine. One may properly speak of stability,
predictability, and legitimacy from precedent precisely because a
superior court—and ultimately a court of last instance—is able to
speak with final authority on the law within its defined jurisdiction. It
is this final authority, in other words, that creates and reinforces the
94
value of “calm” at the foundation of stare decisis.
This consideration in turn requires fidelity in both the doctrine’s
95
vertical and horizontal dimensions. When a polity constitutes
96
inferior courts with the same jurisdiction, a functional concept of

91. Massachusetts courts may, of course, resolve disputes that involve the application of
New York law. But any interpretation of New York law, although final in the dispute at hand,
would not be binding on New York courts in the future. This is true notwithstanding the federal
Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which was designed to mitigate the
coordination problems associated with a federation of sovereign states. See Univ. of Tenn. v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798–99 (1986) (“Perhaps the major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is to act as a nationally unifying force . . . .” (quoting Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co.,
448 U.S. 261, 289 (1980) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Thomas, 448 U.S. at 271–72 (plurality opinion) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause ‘is
one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of
transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation.’” (quoting Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948))).
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
93. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 387 (1986) (“[W]e have no
authority to review state determinations of purely state law.”); West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311
U.S. 223, 236 (1940) (“When [the highest court of the state] has spoken, its pronouncement is to
be accepted by federal courts as defining state law . . . .”).
94. See supra note 16.
95. See Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1085–86 (2003) (examining these dimensions of stare decisis).
96. The term “jurisdiction” here does not necessarily connote a bounded geographical
area. A particular polity may choose to have more than one “supreme” court, with jurisdiction
delineated by subject matter. An example is Texas, which has a Supreme Court, but also has a
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stare decisis requires that these courts be tied into a hierarchically
integrated system with opportunities for oversight by superior courts.
The great bulk of judging is done by lower courts. Vertical stare
decisis thus especially serves the core values of system stability and
predictability, for it is by this means that the precedents of superior
courts have practical effect through mandatory adherence by inferior
courts throughout the system.
Horizontal stare decisis, by contrast, addresses the force of a
precedent on the issuing court itself and thus has special significance
97
for the value of judicial legitimacy. The requirement that even a
supreme court identify compelling grounds before reexamining its
own precedent reinforces the appearance of a principled, law-bound
98
judiciary. Presumably, moreover, the most reliable judicial expertise
on the internal law of a particular jurisdiction, as well as on the legal
influence of subsequent developments, is housed in the jurisdiction’s
own highest court.
The ability of stare decisis to advance these values depends
decisively on the power of precedent to control change. In a vertically
integrated system protected by horizontal fidelity to precedent,
systemic stability flows from the premise that all forces of legal
change are endogenous to the system. Faithfully observed, stare
decisis removes any incentives for corrosive relitigation of precedents
99
and thus avoids the destabilizing effects of judicial reexamination.
Once a supreme judicial authority has established a precedent within
its jurisdictional mandate, the only source of future legal change—
save permissible, prospective overrides by the legislature or other
100
lawmaking institutions—should be the same court. It is for this
reason that intervening developments in the law—the stare decisis

Court of Criminal Appeals with “final appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of the
state, [the] determinations [of which] shall be final, in all criminal cases.” TEX. CONST. art. V,
§§ 5–6.
97. See Murphy, supra note 95, at 1085–1101 (examining the historical foundations of the
horizontal force of precedent); id. at 1116–26 (arguing that separation-of-powers principles
preclude the courts from abandoning stare decisis as a constraint on their own discretion).
98. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
99. The constraint on reexamination by lower courts highlights the significance of scholarly
analysis of the continuing validity of precedents. Because of stare decisis and other cultural and
traditional forces, however, courts in the United States generally have not accorded substantial
weight to scholarly arguments about particular precedents.
100. The one noteworthy exception is when Congress has delegated interpretive authority to
an administrative agency for a particular statutory scheme. For more on this point, see infra
notes 352–56 and accompanying text.
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antivalue “of most relevance” —commonly occur only through
erosion at the edges of a precedent over a substantial period of
102
time.
This perspective makes sense within the framework of a modern
nation-state with an independent and hierarchically integrated
judicial branch. The Supreme Court, as the ultimate repository of the
federal judicial power, is able to speak with finality within the scope
of federal law and thereby to control all forces of legal change within
the domestic federal judicial system. As my analysis explores further,
however, matters become considerably more opaque and complex
when one reflexively extends the jurisdictional premises of stare
decisis to a multipolar legal order. Such is the case with international
law. In this realm, the reality of a multipolar system of judicial
cooperation that entirely lacks hierarchical integration means that the
international legal order has no means to create or maintain system103
wide uniformity.
To properly emphasize the implications of this fact, I first return
to the Constitution’s core allocation of powers over foreign affairs.
This foundation permits a deeper exploration of the special
responsibilities of the judicial branch when international-law rights
and obligations fall within its domestic power to declare the law—that
104
is, when they fall within its “juris dictio.”
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The boundaries of the federal judicial power are nowhere more
elusive and elastic than in the field of foreign affairs law. As a general
proposition, the Constitution does not require a “hermetic division
105
among the Branches,” nor does it require that “the three branches

101. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
102. As already noted, see supra note 64 and accompanying text, one of the Court’s most
prominent decisions of the early twenty-first century emphasizing the role of subsequent legal
developments cited nearly one hundred years of erosion to justify overruling a precedent, see
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007) (“We have
distanced ourselves from the [prior] opinion’s rationales. . . . [T]he case was decided not long
after enactment of the Sherman Act . . . . Only eight years after [issuing the opinion], . . . the
Court reined in the decision. . . .”).
103. See infra Part III.B.
104. See supra note 85.
105. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
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of Government ‘operate with absolute independence.’”
Nonetheless, as I demonstrate in this Part, the Constitution’s special
107
arrangement of the “dispersed powers” of government in the field
of foreign affairs creates even greater challenges for the “duty of the
108
judicial department to say what the law is.”
I begin in Section A with a review of the foundational allocations
of authority over foreign affairs in the American constitutional
structure. Section B then examines the institutional and prudential
reasons for judicial caution in this important field. Section C
concludes with a comprehensive analysis of the myriad ways in which
the modern American legal system nonetheless channels foreign
affairs matters, including fundamental issues of international law, to
the federal courts.
A. The Constitution’s Core Allocations of Authority in Foreign
Affairs
Although the Constitution’s general scheme of authority is well
known, a reminder of the distinctive allocations of authority in
foreign affairs provides a necessary foundation for the analysis to
follow. The first principle is that Congress’s position as the
preeminent domestic lawmaker extends to the field of foreign affairs
as well. In addition to conveying a general grant of authority over
109
foreign commerce, the Constitution delegates to Congress the
specific powers “[t]o define and punish . . . Offences against the Law
110
of Nations” and to declare and regulate private involvement in
111
112
war. Moreover, the Necessary and Proper Clause generally
empowers Congress to carry into execution any of the federal powers
113
vested by the Constitution. This conferral of power includes,
significantly, the exclusive authority to transform so-called non-self-

106. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–94 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 707 (1974)).
107. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
110. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
111. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”).
112. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
113. Id.
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executing treaties into domestic law, even beyond the otherwise115
applicable limits on Congress’s Article I powers. The combined
effect of these grants is that Congress has a virtually unlimited field
within which to regulate the domestic-law incidents of foreign affairs,
including through the incorporation of international-law norms into
116
the domestic sphere.
The more prominent challenge for the work of the judiciary in
foreign affairs arises from the special delegations to the president in
the field. Article II, Section 1 generally vests in the president “[t]he
117
executive Power,” a term that itself has generated substantial
118
scholarly debate. But the Constitution also specifically designates
119
the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and
120
confers on him broad authority over ambassadorial relations. These
express delegations have led to the recognition of certain
121
independent powers of the president in foreign affairs, as well as a
general presidential authority to manage routine external legal
122
relations with foreign states.
Of more significance for immediate purposes is the special role
of the president in the creation of domestic law founded on sovereign
114. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (“The responsibility for
transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic
law falls to Congress.”). For more on the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties, see infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text.
115. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–34 (1920) (“If the treaty is valid there can be
no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means
to execute the powers of the Government.”).
116. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 66
(2d ed. 1996) (concluding, after reviewing Supreme Court precedent on the foreign-commerce
power, that that power “might be sufficient to support virtually any legislation that relates to
foreign commerce, i.e., to foreign relations”).
117. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
118. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as
Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey,
The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
120. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the president the power, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to “appoint Ambassadors . . . and Consuls”); id. art. II, § 3 (conferring authority on
the president to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”).
121. Prominent among these powers are the power to recognize foreign governments, see,
e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 212 (1962), and the power to direct the tactical aspects of external military conflicts, see,
e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603,
615 (1850).
122. For more on this point, see infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
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commitments under international law. Article II, Section 2 empowers
the president to “make Treaties,” provided two-thirds of the senators
123
present concur. The Supreme Court also has endorsed a unilateral
executive power to conclude binding international legal agreements,
in some cases with domestic-law effects—effects I consider in Section
124
C —and has not required compliance with the constitutionally
125
prescribed procedures for the approval of treaties. Finally, the
president’s position as the country’s “constitutional representative” in
126
foreign affairs affords him substantial authority, in the external
realm, over the acceptance of norms of customary international law
127
on behalf of the United States.
The legal norms created by the political branches that regulate
foreign affairs, like any other form of federal law, may fall within the
enforcement authority of federal courts. In parallel with
corresponding clauses for the legislative and executive powers,
Article III, Section 1 “vest[s]” the judicial power of the United States
in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may
128
establish. Offering no textual differentiation, Section 2 of the same
article then defines the judicial power to include “all Cases” arising
129
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. The
Supremacy Clause of Article VI likewise includes treaties within the
130
scope of the “supreme Law of the Land.” The inclusion of treaties
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
124. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.
125. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (recognizing such a power);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981) (“[T]he President does have some measure
of power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of the
Senate . . . .”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“[A]n international
compact . . . is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate.”).
126. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting S. COMM.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 14TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REP. OF FEBRUARY 15, 1816, reprinted in S.
DOC. NO. 56-231, pt. 6, at 19, 21 (1901)).
127. See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 (declaring that “in foreign affairs the President has
a degree of independent authority to act”); Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 320
(observing that in foreign affairs, the president has “a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved”). In
more practical terms, the president controls the expression of consent through the formal
representatives of the United States in a variety of international organizations, including the
United Nations, see, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 287 (2006) (authorizing the president to appoint
representatives to the United Nations), nearly all of whom participate in creating norms of
international law.
128. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
129. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
130. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
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in these parallel lists has obvious significance for my analysis. Also of
note, Article III expressly extends the federal judicial power to cases
involving ambassadors and similar matters that carry special foreign
131
affairs sensitivities.
Article III’s description of federal judicial authority nonetheless
draws no distinction between foreign affairs and any other category of
cases. Even the traditional judicial concerns over federalism
constraints on national power wither to near insignificance in foreign
132
affairs. Moreover, as underscored by federal judges’ Article VI oath
133
“to support th[e] Constitution,” nothing in the Constitution requires
134
or permits judges to refuse either “to render dispositive judgments”
in foreign affairs disputes properly before them or to resolve disputed
135
issues of law in the process. As the Supreme Court thus observed in
a 1990 opinion with immediate foreign-policy implications, “Courts in
the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to
136
decide cases and controversies properly presented to them.”
B. Judicial Reticence, Judicial Deference
Nonetheless, the federal courts’ opinions at times have reflected
a lack of judicial self-esteem in the field of foreign affairs. The judicial
branch, of course, has no authority to conduct or oversee the foreign
policy of the United States. But occasional judicial rhetoric has
suggested that, even in actual cases and controversies properly before

131. Id. art. III, § 2 (extending the judicial power to cases affecting “Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls,” “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,” and
controversies between states or citizens “and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”).
132. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (“[F]oreign affairs and
international relations [are] matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal
Government . . . .”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (making the same
point and declaring that the Constitution “speaks with no uncertain sound upon this subject”).
To emphasize the point, the Constitution also expressly prohibits the states—in a departure
from the default assumption of mostly concurrent lawmaking powers—from entering into any
formal foreign affairs obligations on their own. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation . . . .”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting the
states from concluding “any Agreement or Compact with . . . a foreign Power” without the
consent of Congress).
133. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
134. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (declaring that “a ‘judicial
Power’ is one to render dispositive judgments” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 323
(2007) (making a similar point based on Article VI’s required oath to support the Constitution).
136. W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990).
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them, the courts generally believe that they lack the competence to
question the judgments of the political branches in the field of foreign
137
affairs. Thus, as the Supreme Court declared in Regan v. Wald —to
138
choose just one example of the many “sweeping statements” to this
effect—“Matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to
139
be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.’”
Such rhetorical flights have provoked excited scholarly debates
140
141
that continue to this day. Baker v. Carr —certainly the most
significant modern opinion on the political question doctrine—put to
rest the extreme notion that every case with foreign-policy
142
implications falls outside judicial cognizance. Moreover, no majority
opinion of the Supreme Court has actually applied the formal
political question doctrine to justify abstention in a foreign affairs
143
case, although several opinions have acknowledged the targeted
144
constitutional powers distinctly delegated to the other branches.
137. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
138. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“There are sweeping statements to the
effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions.”).
139. Regan, 468 U.S. at 242 (omission in original) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 589 (1952)); see also Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The
conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the Government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.”).
140. For comprehensive treatments of the subject, see generally THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,
1996); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); and JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE:
THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
141. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
142. See id. at 211 (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”). The Court reiterated the point two years
later in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See id. at 423 (“[I]t cannot of
course be thought that ‘every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance.’” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211)).
143. What Professor Louis Henkin said in 1996 remains true: “There is . . . no Supreme
Court precedent for extraordinary abstention from judicial review in foreign affairs cases.”
HENKIN, supra note 116, at 146; cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–04 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing, in an opinion joined by three other Justices, that the issue
of termination of a treaty by the president is “nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of
the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the
Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President”).
144. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (recognizing the power
of the president to recognize foreign governments); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
610, 634–35 (1818) (observing that an executive determination on the legal status of a foreign
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And although the number of lower court abstention opinions is not
insignificant, all of these opinions have addressed specific disputes
145
over the constitutional allocation of powers in the field.
These engagements with the political question doctrine are
reflective of a primitive judicial sense that something is qualitatively
different when courts are called on to apply foreign affairs law.
Justice Sutherland’s description of foreign affairs in United States v.
146
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
as a “vast external realm,
147
with . . . important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems”
continues to resonate in modern opinions. Indeed, Baker v. Carr itself
sketched the reasons for a special judicial modesty in this context.
Even aside from formal constitutional commitments to another
branch, the Court has observed that the resolution of issues in the
field “frequently turn[s] on standards that defy judicial application”
or that “uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the
148
Government’s views.” More generally, the Court’s opinions have
emphasized the inability of courts to gauge the precise implications of
149
their decisions for the delicate subject of foreign relations.
For reasons institutional and prudential, the primary beneficiary
of these judicial sentiments has been the executive branch. Time and
again, federal court opinions have expressed respect for the
conflict under international law “transcend[s] the limits prescribed to the judicial department”).
For a comprehensive analysis of this issue from a textual perspective, see RAMSEY, supra note
135, at 155–73; and Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 118, at 264–65.
145. See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 558–62 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to sit
in judgment on the president’s conduct of war); Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242
F.3d 1300, 1311–20 (11th Cir. 2001) (addressing the approval of treaties by an act of Congress);
Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109, 1109–11 (10th Cir. 1977) (addressing the power of the president
to return cultural property by executive agreement); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337–41
(D.D.C. 1987) (addressing the president’s power to initiate hostilities).
146. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
147. Id. at 319.
148. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also id. at 217 (citing the influence of “an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question”).
149. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. But concerns about offending foreign states
have not led the Court to shrink from its judicial responsibilities when it determines that the law
is clear, as two prominent decisions on treaty law have demonstrated. See Medellín v. Texas, 128
S. Ct. 1346, 1360 (2008) (refusing to enforce the judgment of the ICJ as domestic law because
doing so would “undermin[e] the ability of the political branches to determine whether and how
to comply with an ICJ judgment”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352–53 (2006)
(affirming a procedural-default judgment despite the ICJ’s determination that procedural
defaults do not apply to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note
17).
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president’s independent authority to act in the field and for his “vast
150
share of responsibility” for the nation’s relations with foreign
151
states. Derivative of this sense of respect has been a judicial
recognition, at least in a comparative sense, of the executive’s
152
superior expertise and access to reliable information on such issues.
In light of the executive branch’s institutional advantages—especially
its ability to consider broader perspectives and to act with secrecy and
dispatch—sound reasons support the courts’ perspective. Moreover,
as a practical matter, the president’s ability to take the lead—to give
solemn assurances to foreign states and to pursue paths of action
founded on autonomous interpretations of the law—may work to
153
constrain future judicial reexamination. As I show in more detail in
154
Part III.C.3, this perspective also has been condensed into formal
doctrines that grant deference to the executive branch’s views on the
very content of the law.
In spite of these realities, the field for judicial action in foreign
affairs matters, as demonstrated in the next Section, is considerable
and expanding. A full appreciation of the breadth of this engagement
highlights the significance of establishing inflexible precedents when
the judiciary unavoidably participates in defining the content of
America’s foreign affairs law.

150. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
151. See, e.g., id. (“[I]n foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to
act.”); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (observing that the president
has “unique responsibility” for the conduct of “foreign and military affairs”); Chi. & S. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) (“The President . . . possesses in his
own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as
the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs.”).
152. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (“[W]hen it
comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [the area of national security and
foreign relations], ‘the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked,’ and respect for
the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.” (citation omitted) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981))); Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (accepting an executive
treaty interpretation on the ground that “[t]he Executive is well informed concerning the
diplomatic consequences resulting from this Court’s interpretation” of a treaty, “including the
likely reaction of other contracting states”); see also supra note 1.
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 326(1) (1987) (stating that the president has the authority to interpret treaties
“asserted by the United States in its relations with [foreign] states”).
154. See infra notes 340–45 and accompanying text.
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C. The Significant and Expanding Judicial Responsibilities in Foreign
Affairs Lawmaking
In this Section, I refine my discussion to focus on those aspects of
foreign affairs law that raise special concerns regarding the force of
stare decisis. I have noted that constitutional decisions on foreign
affairs powers are already subject to a weakened form of the
155
doctrine. By contrast, and for reasons that will become clearer in
156
this Section, judicial application of foreign affairs statutes—and
derivative administrative regulations—does not require the same
compromise of the prudential and institutional values at the
foundation of stare decisis. To illustrate this distinction, however, I
must first identify the special category of controversies that fall within
the Article III “judicial Power” of the federal courts and that directly
or indirectly involve those courts in the very definition of the nation’s
rights and obligations under international law.
It is no secret, even for the casual observer of public affairs, that
international law and institutions have played an increasingly
prominent role in the modern law of the United States. Treaty
regimes have proliferated, international institutions have grown in
both number and range of authority, and references to international157
law norms in domestic litigation have become commonplace. The
mandate of the judicial branch does not extend to purely sovereignto-sovereign legal disputes, a point Chief Justice Marshall emphasized
158
early in America’s constitutional history. But international law now
also makes increasing claims to issues in the domestic space. It is
precisely because of this development that the authority of the

155. It is this confined, though significant, subset of issues to which Professor Michael
Ramsey refers with his observation that “[f]oreign affairs law is, at its root, constitutional law.”
RAMSEY, supra note 135, at 1.
156. See infra notes 225–29 and accompanying text.
157. Thus, for example, one list published by the U.S. Department of State lists many
thousands of treaties and other international agreements. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES
IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2011 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/169274.pdf. In addition, a search in the Westlaw database for federal court
opinions reveals more than ten thousand references to “treaty” or “international law” in the
years from 2001 to 2011.
158. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829) (“The judiciary is not that
department of the government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is
confided . . . .”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51
(1833); see also United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 711 (1832) (endorsing this
quotation).
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judiciary to resort to international norms as rules of decision is among
159
the most controversial issues in modern legal scholarship.
Although my allusion to the debate offers some flavor for the
sensitivity of the subject, I need not wade into the controversy in this
Article. My concern is instead the product of judicial action,
regardless of how domestic law has empowered the courts to resolve
disputes by reference to international-law sources. My analysis
begins, in other words, with international legal norms that have
already been validated through domestic recognition mechanisms—
whether those mechanisms be the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.
These norms share five essential characteristics: (1) they have
come into being through international lawmaking processes, and thus
their substance derives in whole or in part from international law;
(2) they affect legal rights or obligations; (3) they have been validated
as domestic law through domestic recognition mechanisms; (4) they
fall within the authority of domestic courts to determine through
binding pronouncements; and (5) they are enforceable through
160
domestic legal sanctions.
When these five characteristics are
present, the Article III judicial power extends to the enforcement of
international-law rights and obligations in domestic law and thus to
the creation of precedents in the process.
International law comes in two principal forms: treaties and
161
customary international law.
Although both create formal
162
obligations as a matter of international law, disputes about the
circumstances in which the courts may enforce these forms of
international law in our domestic legal system have existed since the

159. See supra note 4.
160. I acknowledge an intellectual debt here to the thoughtful analysis by Professors Robert
Scott and Paul Stephan on the general concept of the “formal enforcement” of international
law. See SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 5, at 4, 9–16 (using “the term formal enforcement to
distinguish legalized, institutionally based, privately initiated mechanisms from the traditional
informal means of enforcement that remain subject to state control”).
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(1) (1987) (“A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by
the international community of states (a) in the form of customary law [or] (b) by international
agreement . . . .”).
162. See id. § 102(2) (stating that binding rules of customary international law arise “from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”); id.
§ 102(3) (“International agreements create law for the states parties thereto . . . .”).
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founding of the Republic. But what has not yet been fully
appreciated is the multiplicity of avenues by which the modern
American legal system formally channels norms of international law
into the domestic courts. My goal in the paragraphs that follow is to
canvass these avenues and thereby to highlight the broad and
expanding field of unavoidable judicial involvement in foreign affairs
lawmaking.
164
The classic example of judicially enforceable international law
is a self-executing treaty—that is, a treaty that “operates of itself” as
165
domestic law. To pick just one illustration, the United States has,
since its founding, concluded treaties of “amity, commerce and
166
navigation,” the very purpose of which is to create reciprocal
property and procedural rights for foreign citizens that are
167
enforceable in domestic courts. Because such treaties are supreme
168
law under Article VI, the courts have an “obligation” to enforce
169
them as preemptive federal law. And because of those treaties’
sheer number and substantive subject matters, the scope of this
163. See Kimi Lynn King & James Meernik, The Supreme Court and the Powers of the
Executive: The Adjudication of Foreign Policy, 52 POL. RES. Q. 801, 802, 808–09 (1999)
(purporting to survey all of the Supreme Court cases in history, although with quite limited
search terms, and concluding “that the Supreme Court has often issued decisions where there
are American foreign policy concerns”); Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial
Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE
L.J. 855, 861 (2005) (examining “every foreign affairs case on the [Supreme] Court’s docket
from 1791 to 1835” and concluding that foreign affairs matters were part of “the day-to-day
business of the Court”).
164. Cf. John McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1176–77 (2007) (employing the term “domesticated international law,” but
only in the narrower sense of norms that “our political branches have expressly made part of
our law through the legislative process”).
165. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
166. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, 8
U.S.T. 138; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 U.S.T.
116.
167. Cf. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1365 (“[W]e have held that a number of the ‘Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation’ Treaties . . . are self-executing . . . .” (citation omitted)); McKesson
Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that the Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, “like
other treaties of its kind, is self-executing”).
168. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
169. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (observing that self-executing treaty provisions
have “the force and effect of a legislative enactment” (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103, 109 (1801) (holding that because a treaty is the law of the land, “its obligation on
the courts of the United States must be admitted”).

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

STARE DECISIS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

975

judicial obligation is broad indeed: the list of self-executing treaties
170
ratified by the United States now certainly exceeds five hundred.
But treaties may fall within judicial cognizance by other means as
well. That is, even non-self-executing treaties may have force as
171
domestic law through congressional adoption of “treaty-statutes,”
172
whether through wholesale legislative transformation, targeted
173
incorporation—of which dozens of examples exist —or so-called ex
174
post congressional-executive agreements.

170. Unfortunately, the State Department does not keep separate records for self-executing
treaties. My own research has confirmed that over five hundred exist. See Michael P. Van
Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 921–23 (2004)
(“The number of treaties that contain self-executing provisions is now over four hundred (even
excluding treaties with Native American tribes).” (footnote omitted)); Michael P. Van Alstine,
Self-Executing Treaties List (2004 and Before) (2004) (unpublished research) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). Contrary to popular perception, the Bush administration was particularly
active on this score: in eight short years it oversaw the ratification of over one hundred selfexecuting treaties and related protocols. Michael P. Van Alstine, List of Treaties Approved
During Bush Administration that Are or Likely Are Self-Executing (2009) (unpublished
research) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
171. For an article that develops a framework for understanding how Congress uses
language and concepts from treaties in domestic legislation, see John F. Coyle, Incorporative
Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655 (2010).
172. Prominent examples include the acts implementing the U.N. Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 3, see 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006), the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 97-12, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 (1986),
see 9 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (1983), see 42 U.S.C.
§ 11601(b)(1) (2006), and the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10, see Cape
Town Treaty Implementation Act of 2004, 49 U.S.C. § 44101 (2006).
173. In this vein, Congress has often expressly referred to treaties to supplement or limit
legislation or to delegate implementation authority to executive agencies. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.
§ 802 (2006) (providing that the Uniform Code of Military Justice applies to any person
“[s]ubject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party”); 16
U.S.C. § 1435(a) (2006) (requiring regulations on national marine sanctuaries to comply “with
treaties, conventions, and other agreements to which the United States is a party”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 957 (2006) (providing criminal sanctions for any person who “knowingly and willfully
possesses or controls any property or papers used or designed or intended for use in
violating . . . rights or obligations of the United States under any treaty”); Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-227, div. G, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761,
2681-822 to -823 (empowering the “appropriate agencies” to adopt regulations to implement
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1987)); Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-228, § 2, 105 Stat. 1691,
1691–93 (“The authorities provided in this chapter shall be exercised consistent with the
obligation incurred by the United States in connection with the CFE Treaty.”); see also Michael
P. Van Alstine, List of Statutory Incorporations of the “Law of Nations” or “International Law”
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The enforcement of customary international law by federal
175
courts is a more controversial subject. As a general matter, the
Supreme Court has only endorsed federal common-lawmaking for
176
certain narrow “enclaves” of “uniquely federal interest.” One
prime—though hotly contested—example of an enclave, however, is
177
the federal common law of foreign affairs. The Court itself
reinvigorated controversy on this score in 2006 with its rhetoric about
178
“international law cum common law” in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
179
In the face of spirited scholarly debates, the Sosa Court reaffirmed
that “the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of
180
nations.” Again, however, I need not engage here with the details of

(2012) (unpublished research) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing a comprehensive
list of such legislative references to treaties).
174. Congressional executive agreements reflect legislative approval of a treaty through
standard Article I legislation, not through the Article II treaty process. In such cases, however,
Congress has commonly adopted comprehensive legislation that is so dense as to preclude
resorting to the treaty for substantive interpretive material. One example is the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, which includes a
declaration that its provisions alone “satisfy the obligations of the United States [under the
Convention]” and that “no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that
purpose,” id. § 2(3), 102 Stat. at 2853; see also North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1) (2006) (“No provision of the Agreement, nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is inconsistent with any
law of the United States shall have effect.”); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3512(a)(1) (2006) (“No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any
law of the United States shall have effect.”).
175. See supra note 4.
176. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426–27 (1964); see also Boyle v.
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“But we have held that a few areas . . . are so
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is
pre-empted and replaced . . . by federal law of a content prescribed . . . by the courts—so-called
‘federal common law.’”); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)
(“[T]he Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what
has come to be known as ‘federal common law.’” (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947))); Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 307 (“Hence, although federal judicial
power to deal with common-law problems was cut down [by the Erie doctrine], that power
remained unimpaired for dealing independently, wherever necessary or appropriate, with
essentially federal matters . . . .”).
177. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 640 (declaring that federal common law governs
“international disputes implicating . . . [American] relations with foreign nations”).
178. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); id. at 712.
179. See supra note 4.
180. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–30. The Court further noted that “[i]nternational law is part of
[American] law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
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this contentious debate. It will suffice to observe that, at least in some
circumstances, the federal courts are empowered to enforce uniform
federal rules founded in international law—solely on their own
181
authority, if necessary.
In any event, a far more common source of authority for judicial
enforcement of customary international law is a delegation from
182
Congress. Early in America’s constitutional history, the Supreme
Court endorsed Congress’s power to delegate discretionary authority
183
to the courts. And since then, Congress has done so with great
frequency. Well over one hundred legislative provisions describe
rights or obligations, or otherwise define legal norms, through an
184
incorporation of “the law of nations” or “international law.” The

their determination.” Id. at 730 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
181. See id. (concluding that the “door” for judicial enforcement of international law
remains “open to a narrow class of international norms today”); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423
(“[I]t is, of course, true that United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in
appropriate circumstances . . . .”).
182. The proper place of maritime and admiralty law in this analysis poses special
challenges. The Supreme Court has long reasoned that Article III’s express inclusion of those
matters in “the judicial Power” impliedly empowers the federal courts “to draw on the
substantive law ‘inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction’ and to continue the
development of this law within constitutional limits.” Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959) (citation omitted) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932)).
In some early cases, the Court referred extensively to “the law of nations” in fulfilling this
responsibility. See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159 (1795) (relying on the “law of
nations” as part of the Court’s reasoning); Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 9 (1794)
(“[B]y the law of nations, the courts of the captor can alone determine the question of
prize . . . .”). Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, Congress additionally granted to
the federal district courts original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). Congress also included a savings clause that permitted
such cases also to proceed in state courts under state law. Id. As a result, maritime and
admiralty law reflects an amalgam of state and federal law. It is, to be sure, also informed by
international law, but it does not derive its content directly from that source.
183. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820) (upholding a conviction
under a congressional act that criminalized piracy “as defined by the law of nations” against a
claim that Congress could not leave the matter to judicial interpretation); United States v.
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 632 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“[W]hen Congress enacts a statute that
expressly incorporates customary international law into the domestic law of the United States,
the federal courts are required, as with any other constitutional congressional mandate, to
follow the statutory language adopted by Congress and apply customary international law.”).
184. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006) (reserving the right of the military to try offenses that
“by . . . the law of war” may be tried by military commissions); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006)
(criminalizing piracy “as defined by the law of nations”); 22 U.S.C. § 462 (2006) (empowering
the president to detain foreign vessels at American ports when permitted “by the law of
nations”); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006) (providing that a foreign state will not be immune from
the jurisdiction of the federal courts when “rights of property taken in violation of international
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185

most controversial of these provisions is the Alien Tort Statute,
which the Supreme Court found in Sosa to contain an implied
delegation of authority to the courts to recognize tort claims—
especially human-rights tort claims—that allege violations of
186
international law.
A variety of derivative administrative
187
188
regulations and executive orders contain similar incorporations of
international law. In all such cases, the identification of the governing
norms of international law falls to the federal courts.
The authority for judicial enforcement of international law also
189
may come solely in the form of executive agreements. Such
agreements, made entirely on the basis of the executive’s independent
powers under the Constitution, may have limited domestic legal
190
effects. A much more significant field of operation for executive
agreements, however, results from delegations of authority by
Congress. Indeed, Professor Oona Hathaway estimates that between
1990 and 2000 alone, the executive branch concluded over 1300

law are in issue”); see also Van Alstine, supra note 173 (surveying these legislative
incorporations).
185. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (granting to the district courts “original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States”).
186. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730–31 (“The First Congress, which
reflected the understanding of the framing generation and included some of the Framers,
assumed that federal courts could properly identify some international norms as enforceable in
the exercise of § 1350 jurisdiction.”).
187. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 922.4 (2011) (providing that regulations implementing a National
Marine Sanctuary designation “shall be applied in accordance with generally recognized
principles of international law”); 32 C.F.R. § 153.5(b) (2011) (requiring that military
investigations of civilians in foreign countries “shall be conducted in accordance
with . . . applicable international law”); 33 C.F.R. § 160.107 (2011) (providing that Coast Guard
port authorities may deny entry to certain vessels “subject to recognized principles of
international law”).
188. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,178 § 11(a), 65 Fed. Reg. 76,903, 76,910 (Dec. 7, 2000),
reprinted as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 6401 app. at 1057, 1061 (2006) (requiring that an ecosystem
reserve be managed “in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”);
Exec. Order No. 10,637 § 1(m), 20 Fed. Reg. 7025, 7027 (Sept. 20, 1955), reprinted as amended in
3 U.S.C. § 301 app. at 617, 618 (2006) (empowering the secretary of homeland security to
withhold clearance for any vessel believed to be carrying weapons “in violation of the laws,
treaties, or obligations of the United States under the law of nations”).
189. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive review of the subject,
see generally Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573
(2007).
190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303(4) (1987) (stating that the president may make a sole executive agreement
“dealing with any matter that falls within his independent powers under the Constitution”).
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191

executive agreements pursuant to formal legislative delegations.
Thus, for example, in 2000, President Clinton concluded executive
agreements with Germany, Austria, and France to address lingering
192
private claims from the Second World War. Beyond these formal
examples, the Supreme Court has recognized a parallel executive
power if supported by a “‘particularly longstanding practice’ of
193
congressional acquiescence.”
A final method by which federal courts recognize the
international legal obligations of the United States is an indirect one.
Through a variety of interpretive presumptions, the courts have given
effect to international legal norms not otherwise recognized through
more formal mechanisms. The most prominent among this group is
the general presumption that when Congress adopts domestic
194
legislation, it intends to abide by international law. A parallel
presumption operates to protect international norms contained in
195
196
treaties and executive agreements. Each of these metarules of

191. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance,
119 YALE L.J. 140, 155–65 & n.29 (2009) (“Between 1990 and 2000, for example, approximately
twenty percent of [the 1747 total executive agreements concluded] were sole executive
agreements. The remaining eighty percent [or 1300 executive agreements] were congressional
executive agreements.”).
192. See Agreement Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War
II, U.S.-Fr., Jan. 18, 2001, Temp. State Dep’t No. 01-36, 2001 WL 416465; Agreement
Concerning the Austrian Fund “Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation,” U.S.-Austria, Oct. 24,
2000, 40 I.L.M. 523 (2001); Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance,
Responsibility and the Future,” U.S.-Ger., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298. For a review of the
history of these agreements, see American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 402–09
(2003).
193. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1352 (2008) (quoting Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415).
194. The rule traces its lineage to Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804); id. at 118 (“It has also been observed than an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”); see also
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (observing that
“principles of customary international law” reflect “law that (we must assume) Congress
ordinarily seeks to follow”). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479,
517–24 (1998) (questioning the legislative-intent and internationalist conceptions behind the
Charming Betsy canon). See generally Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and
Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Revisited, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61
(2007) (examining whether this presumption should extend to constitutional interpretation).
195. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1995)
(“[A] concern [for judicial interference with international agreements] counsels against
construing [the treaty] to nullify foreign arbitration clauses because of inconvenience to the
plaintiff or insular distrust of the ability of foreign arbitrators to apply the law.”); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (“There is, first, a firm and
obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous
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interpretation necessarily involves a primary judicial determination of
the content of international law. That is, each protective presumption
first requires a court to identify the international legal norms with
which ambiguous domestic law might conflict.
To be sure, the constitutional requirement of domestic
recognition creates a discrete moment when domestic lawmaking
institutions can filter the content of international law. In nearly all
such moments thus far, however, the lawmaking institutions have
merely given their blanket assent, whether ex post or ex ante, to the
197
enforcement of international-law norms in domestic law. The
infrequency of controversies over the significance of preratification
198
What remains is
Senate treaty debates illustrates this point.
substantial judicial agency, and thus leadership, over the
identification of the very content of the nation’s legal obligations
under international law.
III. EXAMINING THE COMPLICATED ROLE OF STARE DECISIS IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The striking fact from my analyses of foreign affairs and stare
decisis is how little they seem to have in common. Accepted doctrine
reflexively accords judicial decisions in foreign affairs the same stare
decisis force as any prosaic form of domestic law. Indeed,
notwithstanding the sheer volume of opportunities, the Supreme
Court has never seriously examined the proper role of stare decisis

congressional action.”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (“A treaty will not be
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part
of Congress has been clearly expressed.”).
196. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (applying the presumption in favor of
an executive agreement).
197. The Senate is free, of course, to condition its consent on a formal amendment of the
treaty’s text or otherwise to attach reservations, understandings, or declarations (RUDs). Doing
so is now a common practice during the Senate’s ratification of human-rights treaties when the
Senate considers the binary question of self-execution. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 402
(2000) (examining and defending the use of RUDs). In such a case, however, the treaty partners
have the right to object and refuse renegotiation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
arts. 19–21, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336–37 (1980) (defining the
rules of international law on this subject).
198. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 367 n. 7 (1989) (sanctioning the use of such
materials). But see id. at 373–74 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting resort to such materials
because “[t]he question before [the Court] in a treaty case is what the two or more sovereigns
agreed to, rather than what a single one of them, or the legislature of a single one of them,
thought it agreed to”).
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when a court creates a precedent in foreign affairs, even a precedent
involving the rules that govern the nation’s formal legal relations with
199
foreign states under international law. This Part argues that such an
examination is long overdue.
Section A first establishes the context with a review of why
substantially more is at stake in matters of international law than in
matters of purely domestic law. Section B demonstrates that even the
basic premises of stare decisis may become compromised when courts
create precedent on international law. Section C then explores the
institutional perspective, specifically the fact and impropriety of
judicial leadership in this sensitive field. I then pull the threads
together in Part IV with an argument not only in favor of a more
nuanced understanding of stare decisis for international-law
precedents but also in favor of the existing regime of stare decisis for
precedents involving purely domestic law.
A. The Special Responsibility of the Judicial Station
International legal norms differ importantly in both process and
product from law of a purely domestic origin. By their very nature,
international norms reflect formal rights or obligations under
international law and thus function as elements of that independent,
external legal regime. Yet disputes involving international law, as
discussed, may also “arise under” federal law and may thus fall within
200
the domestic enforcement authority of federal courts.
The archetype of this duality is a treaty. A treaty is first and
201
fundamentally a product of international law. Its primary function is
202
to create reciprocal legal obligations among sovereign states. And
because treaty obligations are elements of an independent, external

199. As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court has only rarely even paused to
mention the force of precedent in such cases. See supra note 6.
200. See supra Part II.C. For an introduction to this abstract debate over dualism versus
monism, see generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the
Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999); and Melissa A. Waters, Creeping
Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007).
201. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 197, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 339 (declaring as a core principle that agreements between states reflect binding obligations);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 321
(1987) (same).
202. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (declaring that a treaty is
“primarily a compact between independent nations” (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S.
580, 598 (1884)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

982

[Vol. 61:941

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

legal regime, the breach of these obligations may occasion
international discord, including various forms of tangible
203
204
retribution. But under the combined force of Articles III and VI,
the U.S. Constitution also permits “self-executing” treaties to fulfill
the dual functions of international legal obligation and judicially
205
enforceable domestic law.
Even in the case of self-executing treaties, however, the second
function operates on the foundation—and against the interpretive
backdrop—of the first. The Supreme Court thus long ago recognized
that even the domestic-law incidents of a treaty depend on the formal
legal acts required for the treaty’s entry into force under international
206
law. The substantive content of a treaty similarly is derived from its
international origins. Treaty jurisprudence acknowledges this point
207
through a web of related interpretive principles.
Thus, the
understandings and practices of international law, not “any artificial
or special sense impressed . . . by local law,” provide the interpretive
208
background. Moreover, the ultimate responsibility of a court is “to

203. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 197, art. 60, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 346 (setting forth the right of states to terminate a treaty for material breach by a
member state); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598 (observing that if “the interest and the
honor of the governments which are parties to [a treaty] . . . . fail, its infraction becomes the
subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to
seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war”).
204. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (“[A] treaty
ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land but also an agreement among
sovereign powers . . . .” (citation omitted)); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty
Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 157–59 (emphasizing the dual nature of treaties); David H.
Moore, Essay, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?: Equivalence, Duality, and NonSelf-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 2246–48 (2010) (noting that the dual nature of
treaties justifies self-execution). For a comprehensive comparative study of this subject, see
generally THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009).
206. See Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 230 (1901) (holding that the treaty in
question did not “take effect upon individual rights, until there was an exchange of
ratifications”); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 34 (1869) (holding that the force of a treaty
under domestic law depends on the formal international-law act of the exchange of instruments
of ratification).
207. Like all such inquiries, the interpretation of a treaty “begins with its text.” Abbott v.
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010) (quoting Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
208. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); see also United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 51, 86–87 (1833) (interpreting a treaty against the backdrop of the “modern usage of
nations”); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 246 (1817) (“[T]he language of the law of
nations . . . is always to be consulted in the interpretation of treaties.”).
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read [a] treaty in a manner ‘consistent with the shared expectations of
209
the contracting parties’” precisely because a treaty reflects agreed
commitments among sovereigns under international law.
This “shared” aspect carries important implications for the work
of the federal courts. First, and tellingly, the proper sources of
interpretive material are the international negotiating and drafting
210
records—the so-called travaux préparatoires. Evidence of shared
original intent likewise may be found in the “practical construction”
of the treaty parties through their course of conduct post211
ratification. Moreover, a prime aim of judicial enforcement of a
treaty is uniformity of interpretation by the parties’ respective
212
domestic courts. To secure this goal, the Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized that “[t]he ‘opinions of our sister
213
signatories’ . . . are ‘entitled to considerable weight.’”

209. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 399 (1985)); see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)
(observing that in interpreting a treaty, a court’s “role is limited to giving effect to the intent of
theTreaty [sic] parties”).
210. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States is
‘an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as ‘aids to its interpretation’
the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty . . . .” (quoting Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 226)).
211. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991) (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 396); see
also O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986) (“The course of conduct of parties to an
international agreement . . . is evidence of its meaning.”).
212. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1991 (emphasizing that in interpreting a treaty, a “uniform,
text-based approach ensures international consistency”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.
331, 383 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that “uniformity is an important goal of treaty
interpretation”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 325 cmt. d (1987) (“Treaties that lay down rules to be enforced by the parties through
their internal courts or administrative agencies should be construed so as to achieve uniformity
of result despite differences between national legal systems.”).
213. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting El Al Isr.
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also E. Airlines, 499 U.S. at 550–51 (noting that the Court “must also consult the opinions of
[its] sister signatories” when determining the meaning of a treaty). See generally Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 579, 579–81 (2004)
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004), in
which the majority and dissent applied El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S.
155 (1999), and arrived at opposite conclusions). The Supreme Court has, on occasion, also cited
subsequent developments in other maritime nations as grounds for overruling admiralty
precedents. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 397–98 (1975) (observing,
in connection with the overruling of an earlier admiralty rule, that “[t]he courts of every major
maritime nation except [the United States] have long since abandoned th[e] rule”); Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388–89 (1970) (citing subsequent judicial and legislative
developments in England as one ground for overruling a longstanding rule of admiralty law).

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

984

[Vol. 61:941

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Although the authority on treaties is richer, the same basic
considerations apply for the judicial application of executive
agreements and customary international law. Executive agreements
also may live a dual life as formal sovereign obligations under
214
215
international law, as well as judicially cognizable domestic law.
Likewise, norms of customary international law—once they coalesce
through a near-universal state practice followed “from a sense of legal
216
obligation” —reflect binding rights or obligations under
international law. As I have shown, in a large variety of
circumstances, these international norms also may fall within the
217
domestic enforcement authority of federal courts.
The essential message here is that when courts discharge their
Article III duty to enforce treaties, customary international law, and
executive agreements in domestic law, they simultaneously define the
content of international law. Although independent of the political
branches, the judiciary is a formal institution of the United States.
Therefore, when their domestic mandate extends to international law,
federal courts act as functional agents of the United States in external
relations. This reality is attended by the very real possibility that a
misguided domestic court could cause a breach of America’s
international obligations. The international impact of American
judicial action is amply illustrated by the German Constitutional
218
Court’s nearly immediate reaction to the Supreme Court’s treaty
219
decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. At stake in the judicial
resolution of individual disputes under international law, in short, is

214. International law makes no formal distinction between types of “international
agreements.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 197, art. 2(1)(a), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 333 (defining a “treaty” as “an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law”).
215. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“[T]he
courts have the authority to construe . . . executive agreements . . . .” (citing Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 211 (1962))); Kwan v. United States, 272 F.3d 1360, 1363 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although
not a treaty, treaty principles have been applied to interpreting executive agreements.”); Bank
Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Executive agreements . . . are
interpreted in the same manner as treaties and reviewed by the same standard.”).
216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2).
217. See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text.
218. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 19, 2006,
docket number 2 BvR 2115/01, ¶¶ 19–20, 53, (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/rk20060919_2bvr211501.html.
219. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
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the reputation of the United States as a faithful partner in
international relations.
The enforcement of international law through domestic legal
proceedings thus is an immense responsibility. To return to the
example of a treaty, enforcement involves judicial agency in the
formal duty of “good faith” performance, which Professor Louis
Henkin accurately describes as “the most important principle of
220
international law.” In the formative years of the United States, the
Supreme Court was acutely aware of the sensitivity of its position in
such matters. The Court’s analysis in the 1821 case of The Amiable
221
Isabella is worthy of special emphasis. “[I]n delivering [its] opinion
to the world,” the Court in that case declared,
[The issues at stake in treaty enforcement] embrace principles of
international law of vast importance; they embrace private interests
of no inconsiderable magnitude; and they embrace the
interpretation of a treaty which we are bound to observe with the
most scrupulous good faith, and which our Government could not
violate without disgrace, and which this Court could not disregard
without betraying its duty. It need not be said, therefore, that we
222
feel the responsibility of our stations on this occasion.

These sentiments were once reflected in prudential doctrines
designed to protect against judicial imprudence in foreign affairs. The
twin principles of good faith and liberal treaty interpretation served
to remind courts that substantially more is at stake in enforcing
223
treaties than in applying laws of purely domestic origin. But as I
have explained in detail in another article, these venerable doctrines
quietly disappeared from judicial consciousness early in the twentieth
224
century. And as the doctrine of stare decisis coalesced on a separate

220. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 62
(1990).
221. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821).
222. Id.; see also Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884) (declaring that
regarding the interpretation of treaty provisions, “the court cannot be unmindful of the fact that
the honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in every inquiry
whether rights secured by such stipulations shall be recognized and protected”); Bradley, supra
note 205, at 133 (“[E]very treaty is a contract that implicates the U.S. relationship with one or
more other nations, and such a relationship inherently includes political as well as legal
elements, such as considerations of reciprocity, reputation, and national interest.”).
223. For a broad treatment of this subject, see generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death
of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885 (2005).
224. See id. at 1907–19 (detailing the history of good faith in treaty jurisprudence).
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path, judicial decisions insensitive to these concerns were reinforced
with full precedential effect.
Granted, the interpretation and application of legal norms are
standard judicial fare. Additionally, prosaic domestic statutes or
225
regulations may directly affect foreign affairs. But in such cases, the
relationship between lawmaker and law applier is solely a domestic
226
one. When Congress, for example, takes it upon itself to define the
entire content of the law—without importing international legal
norms—the courts need look only to familiar domestic sources and
227
materials to guide their interpretive inquiries. To be sure, judicial
action in these situations may have consequences for foreign
relations. Nevertheless, in the context of purely domestic statutes, the
courts’ essential role is to apply the value judgments first made by
228
Congress within its constitutionally delegated sphere of authority.
Fidelity to those value judgments dispels both the appearance and
229
effect of judicial leadership.
With respect to international law, by contrast, the necessary
consequence of judicial precedent is the definition of rights or
obligations that govern the nation’s relations with foreign states.
Unavoidably, this task involves direct judicial entanglement in foreign
affairs. The immensity of this responsibility should alone give judges
pause before reflexively endowing such precedents with full stare
decisis effect. But as the next Sections demonstrate, even the
premises of stare decisis are compromised when the courts are called
upon to determine the content of international law.

225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1(b) (1987) (including within “foreign relations law” purely domestic law that “has
substantial significance for foreign relations . . . or has other substantial international
consequences”); Moore, supra note 205, at 2250–53 (addressing the same point).
226. For administrative law, the sources of law are domestic regulatory agencies exercising
authority delegated by Congress.
227. The Supreme Court missed this fundamental point in Sanchez-Llamas. In the process
of rejecting a treaty claim in that case, the Court observed that “[i]t [wa]s no slight to the
Convention to deny petitioners’ claims under the same principles [the Court] would apply to an
Act of Congress.” Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006).
228. As I have noted, even in these situations, courts protect against international friction
through interpretive presumptions. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(observing that although the statute in question had direct foreign-policy implications, “under
the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes” and, thus, the
Court could not “shirk this responsibility merely because [its] decision may have significant
political overtones”).
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B. Destabilized Values: The Limits of Authority, Stability, and
Legitimacy
1. Stability and Exogenous Forces of Change: Unipolar Stare
Decisis in a Multipolar System. An essential foundation for a rational
doctrine of binding precedent, as I have explained, is a court of last
instance with the authority to settle the law within its defined
230
jurisdiction. Stare decisis, then, advances the values of stability and
predictability by compelling lower court fidelity in a hierarchically
integrated system and bolsters judicial legitimacy by constraining the
situational discretion of even the declaring court.
Notions of stability and legitimacy take on different dynamics,
however, when the subject matter for judicial precedents is
international law. The origin of the legal norms in such inquiries—the
source from which the norms emerge and derive their content—is the
231
international legal system.
Unfortunately or not, no judicial
authority with the power to issue final and enforceable
determinations on the content of international law exists. The ICJ
could be in a position to fulfill this function. But the United States
232
long ago withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and
it appears prepared to do the same in response to any discrete
233
jurisdictional grants when actual controversies arise. In any event,
234
made abundantly clear in 2008 that the
Medellín v. Texas
international system itself does not compel precedential effect for ICJ
235
judgments.

230. See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part III.A.
232. See Press Statement, U.S. Dep’t of State, Concerning Termination of Acceptance of
I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1743, 1744 (1985) (“[T]he
President has concluded that continuation of our acceptance of the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction would be contrary to our commitment to the principle of equal application of the
law . . . .”).
233. The United States promptly withdrew from an optional jurisdictional protocol to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations following an adverse decision by the ICJ. See Letter
from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Kofi Annan, UN Sec’y-Gen. (Mar. 7, 2005),
reprinted in 2308 U.N.T.S. 71, 71 (2005) (“[T]he United States will no longer recognize the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reflected in [the protocol].”).
234. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
235. Id. at 1367 (“Nothing . . . suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable
result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by
‘many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.’” (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006))).
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All that remains to settle the law are the disparate domestic
courts of the states that compose the international system. But these
courts are not integrated in any structural way, and certainly not
hierarchically so. The process of interpretation and application in this
236
realm is instead multipolar, with authority dispersed among the
various judicial players in the system, as well as among a variety of
other international, governmental, and nongovernmental institutions
that seek to influence the content of the law. The problem is
particularly acute for the unwritten rules of customary international
law, founded as they are on evolving evidence of generalized state
237
practice.
With only a disaggregated judicial system, the
development of precedent on such matters is a process, not an event.
Systemic stare decisis makes no sense here. Systemic cohesion instead
exists only through cooperation driven by good faith adherence to the
238
rule of law among the participants.
The U.S. Supreme Court is, therefore, only one player in a
multipolar field that admits of no binding precedent. The Court’s
extensive review of treaty opinions by foreign courts in Abbott v.
239
240
Abbott provided a positive illustration of this point. To be sure,
the Court remains supreme in its own realm and thus may create
domestic precedent in cases and controversies properly before it. In
matters of international law, however, it lacks the legal authority,
practical ability, and definitive expertise to secure compliance beyond
its domestic mandate. Courts and similar institutions in other states
are free, therefore, to reexamine, undermine, or even flatly reject a
“final” decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. In short, such a final
decision will not control in the very system that provides the content
for the law and in which sanctions would be assessed.

236. I use this term in contradistinction to “polycentric” law. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 238–97 (1998) (describing a
polycentric constitutional system). International law is not a lawless cloud of facts merely
awaiting some indiscriminate form of seeding. It remains essentially state-centered and requires
consent as reflected in the sovereign conduct of states. Though decentralized, the determination
of international law thus proceeds on the foundation of accepted legal rules and through
formalized judicial processes.
237. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
238. For a broader and more hopeful examination of the interaction among courts around
the world, see Martinez, supra note 5, at 460–523.
239. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
240. See id. at 1993–94 (2010) (surveying divergent sovereign interpretations of ne exeat
rights under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction).
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The result is that judicial precedent in matters of foreign affairs
cannot bring the systemic “calm” that stare decisis is designed to
secure. In this multipolar system, a judgment by any one court cannot
control future developments in the system. Contrary to the
jurisdictional premises of stare decisis, in other words, an
international-law decision by a domestic court is subject to immediate
and potentially destructive forces of change exogenous to the
domestic polity.
Moreover, the vast majority of states that compose the
241
international system do not follow stare decisis.
Prudential
considerations continue to hold some sway, as comparative studies of
242
judicial practice have demonstrated. But the prevailing foreign
practice of elevating the law over a mere initial judicial impression of
it demonstrates that immediate adherence to precedent is neither
243
axiomatic nor “indispensable” to the rule of law. Moreover, the
willingness of foreign courts to reassess initial impressions based on a
higher quality of information highlights the inability of any domestic
judicial precedent to introduce stability into the content of
international law.
In any event, careful reflection reveals that existing stare decisis
doctrine already contains the flexibility to recognize—although the
courts themselves have not yet explicitly recognized—that evolving
evidence of international law may immediately undermine a
precedent. I have shown in the area of treaty law, for example, that
the identification of the definitive “shared expectations” of the treaty
partners requires an examination of those partners’ “subsequent
course[s] of conduct,” as well as an analysis of the views of their own
244
domestic courts. Even a Supreme Court treaty decision will not

241. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 22 (2d ed. 1987) (“[S]tare
decisis . . . is . . . rejected by the civil law tradition.”). The ICJ likewise does not follow a formal
doctrine of precedent. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1062, 3 Bevans 1179, 1190 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”).
242. See MERRYMAN, supra note 241, at 47 (“Although there is no formal rule of stare
decisis, the practice is for judges to be influenced by prior decisions.”). For a comprehensive
treatment of the subject, see generally INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).
243. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[I]t is common
wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command.’” (quoting Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
244. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
THE
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control future developments of either of these important interpretive
sources.
This discussion demonstrates that the foundations of judicial
decisions involving international legal norms are particularly
susceptible to immediate destabilization. To be sure, even a purely
domestic-law precedent may be affected by subsequent legal and
societal developments. But stare decisis works as a serious constraint
on such endogenous forces and, except at the margins and over a
significant period of time, almost completely prevents them within the
judicial system. In international-law matters, however, exogenous
forces of change may have an immediate and direct influence on
precedent. And, significantly, the absence of an integrated judicial
system means that a principal catalyst for such change actually may be
later courts called upon to address the same subject.
245
Unfortunately, as noted in the Introduction of this Article, the
Supreme Court has missed two prime opportunities to recognize this
point. In Sanchez-Llamas in 2006, the Court examined the force of
246
subsequent ICJ rulings on an original treaty-interpretation decision.
Regrettably, however, the majority’s opinion focused only on the
247
direct precedential effect of the ICJ rulings. Only Justice Breyer,
writing in dissent, recognized—properly, although only briefly—that
the ICJ decisions in fact reflected the kind of subsequent
248
developments that are relevant for stare decisis analysis. Four years
later, the Court returned to the same subject in Medellín after a
definitive decision by the ICJ that expressly rejected the Court’s
249
earlier decision in Sanchez-Llamas. But the Supreme Court again

245. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
246. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–57 (2006).
247. See id. at 355 (observing that ICJ decisions are entitled only to “respectful
consideration” (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
248. See id. at 389–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that although the Court’s earlier
decisions are “entitled to full stare decisis effect,” the later decisions of the ICJ “amount to a
‘significant . . . subsequent development’ of the law sufficient to lead to a reconsideration of past
precedent” (omission in original) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997)));
Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 689 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In the past the Court
has revisited its interpretation of a treaty when new international law has come to light.”).
249. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1348 (2008) (holding that Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), was not “enforceable federal law”);
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 34, 63 (“[T]he court is unable to uphold
the contention of the United States that . . . it [is] without jurisdiction to order [specific
remedies] . . . .”); supra notes 17–21.

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

STARE DECISIS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

991

250

analyzed only the binding effect of the ICJ’s holding; no Justice saw
the ruling as an additional, subsequent fact that permitted the
Supreme Court itself to reexamine its original analysis.
The point is not that the conclusions in Sanchez-Llamas and
Medellín necessarily were wrongheaded. It is that the Court missed
serious opportunities to refine the proper understanding of stare
decisis in relation to the international legal obligations of the United
States. This failure is especially regrettable for the practice of stare
decisis in the federal courts of appeals. I have much more to say about
that dynamic in the remainder of this Section and in the Sections to
251
follow. The point of emphasis at this stage is that nearly all final
declarations of international law in the United States come from the
252
federal courts of appeals, not from the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, however, the rigid rules of vertical stare decisis that
govern in those courts effectively prohibit consideration of the
exogenous forces that distinctively affect the continuing validity of
judicial precedents on such matters.
2. Expertise and the Risks of Error. The task of a federal court in
interpreting even a purely domestic statute is not an easy one.
Language often is ambiguous, and the lawmaker’s intent often is
unclear. Congress also may default to empty linguistic compromises
to avoid difficult political choices. Some implications of legislation
may not be foreseeable in any event. As a result, even though the
lawmaker and the law applier may share a common legal, political,
and linguistic culture, the proper judicial role in applying statutory
253
law has spawned spirited scholarly debates.
The judicial responsibility to declare the law is substantially more
difficult when the subject is international law. By their nature,
international legal norms result from processes and substantive
compromises that cross legal, political, and cultural divides.
250. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1359 (“ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in
domestic courts.”).
251. See infra Part IV.B.
252. See infra notes 380–85 and accompanying text.
253. For an introduction to the voluminous literature on this subject, see generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); John F. Manning, Deriving
Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (2001); and
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
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Specialized practices, usages, and conventions also provide a
framework for specialized understandings. Even shared legal
254
concepts often require translation—linguistic, cultural, or otherwise.
For any particular domestic court, therefore, the legal product of an
international lawmaking process is, quite literally, foreign.
This characterization is accurate even for conventional law in the
form of treaties and executive agreements. As I have analyzed in
another article, the negotiation and drafting process for treaties—in
particular the inability of the majority to impose its will on
255
objectors—contrasts starkly from that for domestic statutes. With
the overlay of heterogeneity among the negotiators, the result is often
256
broad linguistic compromises of complicated, multilateral origins.
Participant diversity likewise often requires adoption of texts in
257
multiple languages, all of which are equally authoritative. Treaties
may also contain “false friends,” both linguistic and conceptual, and
may otherwise settle only uncomfortably in America’s distinctive
legal culture. Even plain meanings thus may not be so plain.
Customary international law is fraught with the bulk of these
challenges and more. Customary international law arises through a
cooperative, multipolar process whose results are not distilled in any
authoritative text, much less in a coherent, comprehensive
258
compilation. Domestic courts called upon to enforce such rules,
therefore, must examine the results of a fluid process with multiple
players from widely divergent cultural, legal, political, and linguistic

254. See, e.g., Alex Glashauser, What We Must Never Forget when It Is a Treaty We Are
Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1294 (2005) (examining the special challenges in
interpreting international treaties); Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation
of Multilingual Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 611, 615 (1997) (focusing on the
challenges that arise in the common case of treaties with multiple authoritative-language texts).
255. See Van Alstine, supra note 223, at 1923–24 (“The very process of negotiating and
drafting treaties . . . means that the legal product may be fundamentally different than other
forms of law . . . .”).
256. See Bradley, supra note 205, at 157 (discussing the linguistic idiosyncrasies of
multilateral treaties); Van Alstine, supra note 223, at 1923–24 (highlighting the difficulties
inherent in composing complex agreements among multiple sovereigns).
257. See generally Shelton, supra note 254, at 613–18 (providing background information on
the use of multiple languages in various treaties).
258. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 400 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ustomary international
law—as the term itself implies—is created by the general customs and practice of nations and
therefore does not stem from any single, definitive, readily-identifiable source.” (quoting Flomo
v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011))).
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traditions. This diversity may obscure the significance of any
particular state action, expression, or practice. Strikingly uneven
levels of development and international participation further
complicate the picture. Simply gathering reliable information thus
260
represents an enormous undertaking for the courts, especially if
they are to take seriously the requirement of a real “general and
261
consistent” practice of states throughout the international system.
American courts, too, approach the problem schooled in a distinctive
legal system and with their own distinctive cultural assumptions.
The special challenges courts face when they inquire into foreign
affairs already have found expression in Supreme Court opinions. In
particular, I demonstrated in Part II.B how concerns about judicial
expertise, access to reliable information, and the uncertain
implications of judicial precedents have informed analyses of foreign
262
affairs abstention doctrines. Ultimately, these considerations reflect
ex ante admonitions to the courts about the risks of improvident
action based on insufficient or unreliable information. The message,
in short, is that the risks of error in first judicial impressions of
international law are simply greater than with prosaic domestic law.
These combined considerations retain their force even after a
court has created a precedent in the field. That is, the insights about
the need for ex ante judicial modesty in foreign affairs generally do
not lose their relevance simply because a court has taken a stab at
resolving a particular legal issue. Thus, a generic notion of stare
decisis, for all its important functions in any rule-bound system, runs
contrary to the array of prudential cautions against ill-advised judicial

259. See id. (“The determination of what offenses violate customary international law . . . is
no simple task. Customary international law is discerned from myriad decisions made in
numerous and varied international and domestic arenas.” (omission in original) (quoting Flomo,
643 F.3d at 1015)); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1016 (“[A] custom cannot be identified with the same
confidence as a provision in a legally authoritative text, such as a statute or a treaty.”).
260. See Aziz, 658 F.3d at 400 (“[T]he relevant evidence of customary international law is
widely dispersed and generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges.” (quoting Flomo, 643 F.3d at
1015)); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 194 (2d Cir. 2009) (using the same description of
the “relevant evidence of customary international law” (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp.,
414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003))).
261. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
262. See RAMSEY, supra note 135, at 326–27 (“[I]t is surely true that, especially in
international matters, courts sometimes lack access to factual information needed to resolve
cases.”); Charney, supra note 5, at 102–04 (examining, as factors in political question analysis in
foreign affairs, such considerations as “expertise in the law,” “access to facts,” that
“international law is alien,” “important and uncertain effects,” and the need for a “sole voice”);
supra Part II.B.

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

994

[Vol. 61:941

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

leadership in international law—unless one is comfortable with the
conceit that judges nearly always get the answer right the first time.
There is every reason to believe, however, that judicial
misjudgments are more common in the identification of international
263
law. This observation is no slight. The unfamiliar and unstable
terrain simply makes the judicial task more challenging in this field.
In short, an increased likelihood exists that a particular precedent will
264
not be “well reasoned” in the first place. This likelihood does not
mean that courts should abdicate their duty to resolve disputes
properly before them. It is, however, further evidence that rigid stare
decisis norms are inappropriate when, in the context of resolving
these disputes, courts create precedents in the sensitive realm of
international law.
C. Separation of Powers, Stare Decisis, and Judicially Enforceable
International Law
A deeper appreciation of the relationship between precedent
and separation of powers also counsels in favor of a reassessment of
stare decisis as to questions of international law. In foreign affairs
matters, in particular those that touch on international law, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that the judiciary should be
“particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative
265
and Executive Branches.” To reiterate one of my major themes, this
concern—grounded in the separation-of-powers relationships
between the judiciary and the political branches—does not dissolve
merely because a court has created a precedent.
1. Legitimacy of the Judicial Branch and the Blurring of LawFinding with Lawmaking. In the American constitutional system, the
federal judicial branch, “purposefully insulated from democratic
266
pressures,” fundamentally is not a lawmaker. This general principle
deserves special emphasis in the field of foreign affairs. The Court’s
occasional statements that the actions of the political branches in
foreign affairs are “largely immune from judicial inquiry or
263. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
265. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1964) (highlighting the need “to reflect the proper distribution
of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing
upon foreign affairs”).
266. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 518 (1988).
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interference,” though jolting when taken out of context, merely
reflect a basic insight: that the province of the judicial branch does
not extend to supervising questions of foreign relations that are
268
unhinged from Article III cases or controversies. As I have shown,
however, the cases or controversies that nonetheless compel judicial
engagement with international legal relations are broad and
269
numerous indeed.
The judiciary’s position in such engagements differs from its
position with respect to purely domestic law as a matter of kind, not
merely of degree. This point has been woven through much of my
analysis in this Article. Here, I explore the institutional implications.
Recall, first, that a judicial decision on international law by its nature
involves a formal definition of the rights or obligations that govern
the nation’s legal relations with foreign states. At its most
consequential, this task involves the identification of the sovereign
legal obligations of the United States, whether owed to other states or
270
owed to private entities. International law also may address
271
relations solely between private parties; but even in that event,
judicial action is premised on the right or obligation of the United
States to enforce norms that arise out of legal relations with other
272
sovereign states.
This functional sense of agency alone is uncharacteristic of the
judicial station within the American constitutional system. It becomes
especially problematic, however, in light of the nature and the extent

267. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 589 (1952)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
268. See, e.g., Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 488 (1901) (noting that the Supreme Court
“has no power” to enforce international-treaty obligations denounced by the United States);
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (observing that when a treaty does not of its
own force create judicially enforceable domestic law, “its infraction becomes the subject of
international negotiations and reclamations, . . . . [with which] the judicial courts have nothing to
do and [for which they] can give no redress”); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40,
48 (1851) (declaring that whether the United States had complied with its executory promises
under a treaty “is a question . . . with which the judicial branch has no concern”).
269. See supra Part II.C.
270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 101 (1987).
271. For a prominent example, see the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (1988).
272. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES pt. VII intro. note (“[C]ustomary international law and numerous international
agreements have created obligations for states in relation to persons, both natural and
juridical.”).
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of the value judgments that inhere in the identification and
enforcement of international law. As a general matter, uncertainty in
the articulation of legal rules often requires value judgments as courts
273
fulfill their duty to “expound and interpret” the law. As Judge
Jerome Frank observes, the risk in such cases is that “interpretation is
274
inescapably a kind of legislation.”
The problem is particularly acute in the fluid world of
international law. The Supreme Court stated this point directly in
Sosa: “[A] judge deciding in reliance on an international norm will
find a substantial element of discretionary judgment in the
275
decision.”
By whatever term one prefers, discretion in the
identification of binding legal norms inevitably involves lawmaking.
Concerns about freelance lawmaking are greatest with respect to
the identification of customary international law. By their nature, the
276
voluminous domestic incorporations of international law create a
moving target for the judiciary. That is, open-ended references to
“international law” or “the law of nations” require the judiciary to
identify the content of international norms as those norms find
acceptance and evolve through state practice and dialogue over time.
For common-lawmaking of this type, moreover, modern realism has
long since dispatched the fiction that courts merely “find” the law.
Instead, as the Supreme Court aptly observed in Sosa, in most such
matters, “there is a general understanding that the law is not so much
277
found or discovered as it is either made or created.” The absence of
an authoritative text; the complicated and unfamiliar lawmaking
processes; and the linguistic, cultural, and legal differences among the
278
279
participants combine to increase substantially the “open texture”
of this form of judicially enforceable law. In many cases, the

273. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
274. Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (1947).
275. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004).
276. See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text.
277. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725; see also id. at 729 (“[W]e now tend to understand common law
not as a discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a product of
human choice.”).
278. See supra Part III.B.2.
279. The famous scholar of jurisprudence Professor H.L.A. Hart employed this term to
describe the indeterminacy in the law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–25 (1961)
(“Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen . . . will, at some point where their
application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open
texture.”).
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ambiguous mixture of law and policy that pervades international
relations fosters doubt over the very existence of legal rules. The
disordered, fluid process for addressing these consequent doubts
through judicial interpretation only deepens and prolongs the
280
indeterminacy. Even the evidentiary standards are unclear, for
international law sanctions resorting to “any relevant material or
281
source” in identifying the content of the law.
The difficulty of this enterprise is richly illustrated by two federal
court opinions that thoroughly analyzed the international law of
282
piracy but came to diametrically opposed conclusions. At issue in
both cases was an 1819 statute that mandates life in prison for “the
283
crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations.” When first
analyzing the statute in 1820, the Supreme Court looked to a wide
range of interpretive sources on the law of nations: scholarly treatises,
284
“the general usage and practice of nations,” and judicial decisions.
285
When reassessing the issue in 2010 in United States v. Said, a district
court judge relied heavily on principles of stare decisis and specifically
limited construction of the statute to the Supreme Court’s 1820
286
interpretation. The judge concluded, moreover, that this nearly 200year-old Supreme Court precedent “[wa]s the only clear, undisputed
precedent that interprets the statute at issue” and that modern
international-law sources on the definition of piracy “[we]re
287
288
unsettled.” In United States v. Hasan, however, a federal judge
from the same district concluded, after extensive analysis, that the
statutory incorporation of “the law of nations” embraced an evolving
standard of piracy informed by modern norms of customary

280. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 434–35 (1964) (describing as
“quite unpersuasive” the argument that the Court should recognize a rule of international law
on the act-of-state doctrine merely because “United States courts could make a significant
contribution to the growth of international law”).
281. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 113 (1987) (stating that, in such inquiries, “[c]ourts may in their discretion consider
any relevant material or source, including expert testimony”).
282. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v. Hasan, 747
F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).
283. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (2006)).
284. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820).
285. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010).
286. Id. at 559–60.
287. Id. at 564–66.
288. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

998

[Vol. 61:941

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
289

international law. The judge in Hasan went on to hold that, far from
being unsettled as the judge in Said had claimed, modern customary
290
international law defining piracy was clear.
Judicial action in this field also is subject to special sensitivities
not present in purely domestic law, whether embodied in statutes,
regulations, or federal common law. Concerns about the democracy
deficit that surround judicial discretion in general are especially
291
pronounced in the international realm. Moreover, episodic and
interstitial judicial lawmaking involving international law does not
occur within a cohesive domestic legal system like the one familiar to
the courts. This circumstance further exposes the judiciary’s inability
to provide the “flexibility, completeness, and comprehensive
292
coherence” that are especially important in delicate matters of
foreign relations.
To be sure, the Constitution expressly contemplates judicial
293
enforcement of treaties. On this basis, federal courts properly have
294
applied treaties throughout constitutional history. Furthermore, a
treaty’s text provides a substantially more secure foundation for
faithful interpretation. Nonetheless, the identification of treaty
obligations also raises concerns about the nature and extent of
independent judicial value judgments. The special legal, cultural, and
linguistic challenges that complicate the interpretation of treaties also
increase the open texture of the law and thus the space for judicial
discretion. In addition, the evolving, cooperative process of treaty
interpretation in the international realm means that courts shape the

289. See id. at 623 (“[T]he Court concludes that both the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and
Supreme Court precedent indicate that the ‘law of nations’ connotes a changing body of law,
and that the definition of piracy in 18 U.S.C. § 1651 must therefore be assessed according to the
international consensus definition at the time of the alleged offense.”); id. at 623–30 (analyzing
the issue in more detail).
290. See id. at 632 (“Defendants point to the writings of several scholars in arguing that
there is no consensus definition of piracy under modern international law. The Court finds that
the evidence supports a conclusion to the contrary.”).
291. See, e.g., McGinnis & Somin, supra note 164, at 1193–1224 (examining the democracy
deficit in the creation and identification of customary international law).
292. See HENKIN, supra note 116, at 140 (“Judge-made law, the courts must recognize, can
serve foreign policy only interstitially, grossly, and spasmodically . . . .”).
293. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the[] Authority [of
the United States].”).
294. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011)
(comprehensively examining the history of Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence).
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content of the law whenever they purport to interpret it. This
practical constraint on the discretion of future decisionmakers
highlights a phenomenon that Professor Frederick Schauer terms “the
296
forward-looking aspect of precedent.” As a result of this epistemic
force of precedent, judge-found law for treaties functions as a close
cousin of judge-made law.
The consequences of precedent involving international law, as I
have argued, can also be substantially more significant than the
consequences of precedent involving purely domestic law. The
Supreme Court itself has highlighted the “risks of adverse foreign
policy consequences” that attend judicial forays into international
297
law. Granted, not all such matters will touch “national nerves” to
298
the same extent. Nonetheless, even judicial interpretations of purely
private-law treaties can trigger significant international friction. The
recurrent controversies over the proper scope of custodial rights
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
299
Child Abduction provide a good example. Although litigants under
the treaty are private parties, perceived judicial infidelity to this
treaty’s obligations has led to recriminations at the highest levels of
300
government. Indeed, controversies have flared even between the
United States and its close ally Germany over whether German
courts have faithfully fulfilled their obligation under the treaty to
301
return children abducted from the United States. And as the
Supreme Court long ago observed, “[E]xperience has shown that

295. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 103(2)(b) (1987) (declaring that, in determining the content of international law, the
“judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals” are accorded “substantial weight”).
296. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987).
297. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28 (2004).
298. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“It is also evident
that some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on national nerves than do
others . . . .”).
299. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
172.
300. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (highlighting “the diplomatic
consequences resulting from this Court’s interpretation of ‘rights of custody’” under the
Convention, “including the likely reaction of other contracting states and the impact on the
State Department’s ability to reclaim children abducted from [the United States]” (quoting
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 172, art.
5(a), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99)).
301. For a review of this controversy in the early 2000s, see generally Dagmar CoesterWaltjen, The Future of the Hague Child Abduction Convention: The Rise of Domestic and
International Tensions—The European Perspective, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 59 (2000).
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international controversies of the gravest moment . . . may arise from
real or imagined wrongs to [another nation’s] subjects inflicted, or
302
permitted, by a government.”
The message here is not that judicial precedent on matters of
international law is, in a formal sense, “illegitimate,” as Justice Scalia
303
asserted in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. Courts may and should decide
such matters. Increased indeterminacy in the production of
international law, however, entails increased discretion in its
application. This dynamic, in turn, creates the appearance and often
the effect of judicial leadership in the very definition of legal relations
with foreign states. An overwhelming international consensus on a
304
particular issue—say, on torture or genocide —may diminish the
305
impression of judicial innovation. But as courts participate in the
identification of the law itself, they approach the outer edges of their
legitimate judicial function. In doing so, they run a greater risk of
306
undermining the perception of a principled, law-bound judiciary.
Finally, in this field with unclear guideposts, the implications of a
given precedent may be particularly difficult to gauge. Here again,
jurisprudence has addressed the risks of judicial leadership with an ex
ante admonition about untutored ventures into sensitive matters of
307
foreign relations. And here again, the insights of this admonition do
not disappear simply because a court has in fact assumed such
leadership in the form of precedent.

302. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941).
303. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750–51 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
304. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[C]ustomary
international law imposes individual liability for . . . war crimes, crimes against humanity (such
as genocide), and torture . . . .”), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011); Kadic v. Karadžic, 70 F.3d
232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals.”).
305. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“It should be
apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding
it . . . .”).
306. See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text.
307. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (stating that because of the “risks of adverse foreign policy
consequences,” attempts by courts to create remedies for violations of international law “should
be undertaken, if at all, with great caution”); id. at 726 (observing that on such matters, “the
general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority
over substantive law”).
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2. The Uneasy Role of Congress and the Availability of Legislative
Override. The most obvious and potentially significant response to
my analysis thus far is that Congress is available to correct judicial
misadventures on matters of international law just as it can correct
misadventures on matters of domestic law. As discussed, the
possibility of congressional override has led to a “super-strong”
version of stare decisis for statutory-interpretation precedents, as
308
contrasted with constitutional ones. One might reason from this
premise that similar logic should apply to judicial decisions founded
on international law. Careful analysis reveals, however, that proper
respect for Congress’s constitutional role as the substantive lawmaker
in fact counsels in favor of judicial modesty when courts have created
precedents on such matters.
Little doubt exists that Congress has the authority, as a matter of
domestic law, to modify or nullify judicial action interpreting
309
customary international law. Established doctrine also permits
310
Congress to abrogate a treaty. In the Military Commissions Act of
311
2006, however, Congress purported to go further by reversing the
Supreme Court’s pure interpretation of the Geneva Convention
312
Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War
in Hamdan v.
313
Rumsfeld. One could well construct a compelling argument that

308. See supra notes 66–79 and accompanying text.
309. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (declaring that Congress “may modify or cancel any judicial
decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international norm as such”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987) (stating
that “[a]n act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law . . . as law of the United
States”).
310. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1359 n.5 (2008) (“[A] later-in-time federal
statute supersedes inconsistent treaty provisions.”); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899) (“It has been adjudged that Congress by legislation . . . could abrogate
a treaty . . . .”); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (“[A treaty] is subject to such
acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.”). Congress may not,
however, strip vested treaty rights. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899) (observing that
“Congress has no constitutional power to settle the rights under a treaty, or to affect titles
already granted by the treaty itself”); Wilson v. Wall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 83, 89 (1867) (“Congress
has no constitutional power to settle the rights under treaties except in cases purely political.”).
311. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
312. Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1950).
313. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see also Military Commissions Act of 2006
§ 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 1632 (defining “grave breaches” of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention
and declaring that this definition “fully satisf[ies]” the obligations of the United States under the
convention).
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Congress did not have the authority to do so, despite the Necessary
314
and Proper Clause. That is, whether Congress may arrogate to itself
the purely judicial task of treaty interpretation if it otherwise leaves a
315
treaty fully in effect is at least open to question.
In any event, the animating force for the different treatment of
constitutional and statutory precedents is not found in the simple
possibility of congressional override. The special force of stare decisis
on statutory matters instead arises from respect for the policymaking
authority of Congress within the realm of its own legislative
316
products. When Congress itself establishes the content of the law,
the proper role of the judiciary is to implement the value choices
made by the people’s representatives during that process. And once a
court has faithfully done so, deferring to Congress for subsequent
correction of a law of the legislature’s own creation is entirely
appropriate.
On this score, precedents founded on international law differ
fundamentally from those arising from the interpretation of purely
domestic statutes. Congress is the lawmaking source for neither
customary international law nor treaties. Indeed, the rules of
customary international law arise without formal sanction by any
317
domestic legislative institutions. As a result, enforcement of these
314. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43
DUKE L.J. 267, 271–72 (1993) (discussing the “propriety” requirements of the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
315. The distinction here is between abrogating a treaty and compelling the courts to
interpret it in a particular way. The former is clearly a legislative power; the latter shades much
closer to a judicial power reserved to Article III courts. As the Supreme Court observed in Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), Congress may not “indirectly control the action of
the courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to its own views,” id. at 225
(quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 94–
95 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868)). The quoted scholar also observes in the same work that
a legislature may not “compel the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a
law which the legislature permits to remain in force.” COOLEY, supra, at 94. Several Supreme
Court Justices, however, in other circumstances has indicated otherwise. See United States v.
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 375 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]f Congress does not like the
interpretation that a treaty has been given by the courts or by the President, it may abrogate or
amend it as a matter of internal law by simply enacting inconsistent legislation.”); Chew Heong
v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 562–63 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting) (observing that “Congress
may, as with an ordinary statute, modify [a treaty’s] provisions, or supersede them altogether”).
316. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
317. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (observing that the courts “have
no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of
nations”); supra note 258.
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rules in the courts—whether founded on delegated or autonomous
318
authority —requires independent judicial assessment of the content
319
and even the existence of the law. Whatever limited evidence may
be available concerning the formal value judgments that were at play
during the creation of the law, the relevant source is not Congress,
but rather the complicated, fluid, and multipolar lawmaking processes
examined in Part III.B, which are almost entirely external to the
320
American polity.
Though Article II treaties are different in nuance, the same
principle applies. In that context, the value judgments distilled into
law arise through external negotiations with foreign treaty partners
321
within the specialized framework of international law. Moreover,
under Article II, the Senate—not Congress as a whole—is the formal
322
source of legislative approval of treaties. And neither the Senate
323
alone nor even the Senate in cooperation with the president has the
324
power to override a judicial treaty precedent.
This situation substantially complicates the dialogue between
lawmakers and law interpreters that Professor William Eskridge
325
highlights in the context of domestic statutory interpretation. For
matters of international law, the lawmaking process commonly is
unstructured, multipolar, and considerably more opaque. It likewise
involves a continuing and fluid relationship with foreign sovereigns,
managed by the executive branch. The interpretive process itself is a
multipolar enterprise that includes cooperation among systemically

318. See supra notes 175–88 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 273–95 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 277–91 and accompanying text.
321. The same is true for “treaty-statutes,” by which Congress incorporates the substance of
a treaty into domestic law through an Article I lawmaking process. See supra notes 171–74 and
accompanying text.
322. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the president the “Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur”).
323. Professor John Yoo advances the extreme—and, in my view, misguided—opinion that
the president has a “unilateral” power to interpret and reinterpret treaties. John Yoo, Politics as
Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 851, 868 (2001). But see Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty
Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1275–80 (2002) (responding to Professor Yoo’s argument).
324. See Pepke v. United States (In re Fourteen Diamond Rings), 183 U.S. 176, 180 (1901)
(“The meaning of the treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some of those
who may have voted to ratify it.”).
325. See Eskridge, supra note 66, at 353–90 (modeling the interactions among the Court,
Congress, and the president in statutory interpretation).
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unconnected domestic courts and nonjudicial international
326
institutions. The instrumental argument that correction of judicial
precedents should be left to Congress as the original source of law
thus loses its essential justification in this context.
A skeptic would likely respond to this functional point with the
formal argument that Congress nonetheless has the technical
authority to correct judicial precedents on international law as a
327
matter of domestic law. Although valid for purely domestic statutes,
this formalistic point is unconvincing in the context of international
law for three interrelated reasons. The first is a reminder that the
subject of precedent on such matters is distinctly significant and
sensitive: interpretation in these cases involves a declaration of the
rights or obligations that govern the nation’s legal relations with
328
foreign states. When one further considers the courts’ comparative
329
lack of competence, judicial leadership that has been fortified by
stare decisis is problematic in any event.
Second, and more important, the formal argument relies on a
problematic inversion of the standard lawmaking sequence prescribed
by the Constitution—Congress creates; the courts apply. When the
courts instead first find and declare the law, the burden falls on
Congress to overcome the Constitution’s procedural hurdles for the
330
creation of federal statutory law. The “complex set of procedures
that Congress and the president must follow to enact ‘Laws of the
331
United States’” are substantial, time-consuming, and politically
costly. And this process must occur amid the crowded agenda that
generally strains the attention of the nation’s legislators.
For purposes of importing norms from customary international
law, admittedly, the Constitution expressly authorizes action by
332
Congress as a whole. This reality, however, only serves to reinforce
the point. By its nature, a precedent on such a matter involves judicial
326. See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text.
327. Professor Eskridge has suggested that political considerations sometimes make
Congress attentive to judicial decisions, but that many actual “overrides” involve the
modernization of a law by a later Congress, not the correction of judicial error. See Eskridge,
supra note 66, at 335–53 (reviewing congressional overrides from 1967 through 1990).
328. See supra Part III.A.
329. See supra notes 147–54 and accompanying text.
330. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998) (“[T]he power to enact
statutes may only ‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.’” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))).
331. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1206–07 (2009) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945–46).
332. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
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leadership to identify the very existence of the law. A robust version
of stare decisis would then impose on Congress the burden of
overcoming the Constitution’s substantial procedural hurdles simply
to reassert its rightful place as the preeminent lawmaker.
The lawmaking sequence for Article II treaties, to be sure,
includes the original involvement of both the president and the
Senate. Even in this context, however, to say that Congress formally
is available to correct misguided judicial precedents does not mean
that such a constitutional arrangement is preferable. The
334
interpretation of a treaty, in its essence, is a judicial act. Congress
may, by statute, fully abrogate a treaty, but for Congress to leave a
treaty in place and use legislative processes to perform the judicial act
of reinterpreting the treaty to fit legislative preferences is entirely
different.
Moreover, the considerable obstacles to the creation of federal
law are amplified in matters of international law. For purposes of
domestic law, a judicial precedent in the field represents a formal
declaration of the state of international law. Any congressional
attempt to convey displeasure with such a precedent will run into the
dense web of clear-statement rules that protect international law from
335
implicit legislative override. Even the limited openings the Supreme
Court has allowed for acknowledging informal expressions of
336
congressional preferences in statutory interpretation, therefore,
presumably would not be available in the case of a precedent
interpreting international law. To the contrary, congressional inaction
337
may be construed as supportive, as the Court indicated in Sosa.
333. See supra notes 273–96 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (stating that “courts interpret
treaties for themselves”); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899) (“The construction of treaties
is the peculiar province of the judiciary . . . .”).
335. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
336. Existing jurisprudence points in opposite directions regarding the influence of informal
expressions of intent by a subsequent Congress. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (“The ‘classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over
time . . . necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the implications
of a later statute.’” (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988))). But see
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117–18 (1980) (“[T]he
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one.” (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
337. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730–31 (2004) (stating that federal courts
need not “shut the door to the law of nations entirely” because Congress has “expressed no
disagreement” with the courts’ past practice of consulting “international norm[s]”).
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Third, no effective mechanism exists with which to return
questions to the lawmaking source to correct judicial decisions on
international law. The creation or revision of customary international
law, treaties, and executive agreements requires the cooperation of
sovereign entities beyond the reach of the American polity. This
cooperation, moreover, is purely discretionary. As a result,
readjustment of a bilateral treaty or executive agreement at the sole
instigation of the United States can be delicate, and it is practically
impossible in the case of multilateral treaties and customary
338
international law.
In short, the institutional relationship between Congress and the
courts counsels for judicial modesty regarding the force of precedents
on international law. In practical effect, unthinking adherence to stare
decisis locks in problematic judicial leadership against both judicial
reexamination and—even if available in principle—subsequent
congressional override. And as I have shown, in the unfamiliar terrain
of international law, both the consequences and the likelihood of
judicial error are substantially greater in the first place.
3.
Accommodating
the
Executive
Branch’s
Special
Responsibilities in Foreign Affairs. A coherent doctrine of stare
decisis should also accommodate, but should not be overawed by, the
special responsibilities of the executive branch in foreign affairs. I
noted in Part II.B that the executive branch’s comparative
institutional advantages commend a general judicial modesty in
339
foreign affairs matters.
These expressions of respect for the
executive branch’s superior expertise have distilled into formal
doctrines with a direct impact on the province of the courts. Modern
doctrine holds that, although not conclusive, the executive branch’s
340
views on the interpretation of treaties are entitled to “great weight.”

338. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 197, art. 40(4), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 342 (providing that state parties to multilateral treaties cannot be bound to
amendments without their consent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) (observing that the creation of a norm of
customary international law requires a “general and consistent practice of states”); supra notes
258–61 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
340. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted); Medellín v. Texas,
128 S. Ct. 1346, 1349 (2008) (quoting Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 185) (internal quotation mark
omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 326(2) (stating that courts “will give great weight” to executive treaty interpretations).
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Although the quality of precedent on the question is less impressive,
similar sentiments should apply in situations involving customary
341
international law and, presumably, sole executive agreements as
342
well.
Ultimately, these doctrines result in substantial deference to
executive-branch views on the content of international law. Scholars
have even variously described the proposition as “super-strong
343
deference” or as being reflective of a constitutional scheme of
344
“shared” interpretive authority. The historical record of actual
outcomes is uneven, although the weight of evidence points to
considerable deference to executive views, in particular on the
345
interpretation of treaties.
In spite of these protections, judicial precedent involving
international law has the potential to create tensions not present in
purely domestic law. If the subject matter is properly within the
judiciary’s Article III authority, a final precedent determining the
force of international law is binding on the executive branch, just as it
346
is on all other domestic institutions.
This fact alone carries

341. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 112 cmt. c (stating that courts will give “substantial respect” to the views of the
executive branch on questions of international law).
342. See Air Can. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1483, 1486–87 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(observing that an executive-branch interpretation of an executive agreement is likewise
entitled to deference); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 326(2) (extending the deference doctrine to all “international agreement[s]”
concluded by the executive branch).
343. E.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 253, at 1100–02.
344. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118
YALE L.J. 1762, 1793–94 (2009). See generally Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging
New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (2006) (examining the
increasing role of the executive branch in enforcing federalism constraints on the treaty power).
345. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 975–1019 (1994) (canvassing the treaty-interpretation cases of the Rehnquist Court at the
time and concluding that “in all but one the holding followed the express wishes of the executive
branch of the government”); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power
and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1737–52 (2007) (reviewing the rise
of such deference in the early twentieth century). The historical foundations for such deference,
however, are suspect, to say the least. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch
Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 505–22
(2007) (demonstrating that in the first fifty years of the Constitution’s history, the Supreme
Court afforded little or no deference to executive-branch treaty interpretations).
346. See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)
(declaring that judgments within the authority of federal courts “may not lawfully be revised,
overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government”); Hayburn’s
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important “collateral consequences,” for judicial missteps may
wrongly constrain, or at least embarrass, the executive branch in its
conduct of the nation’s foreign relations. Moreover, correction of
such missteps at the international level is difficult, if not impossible.
The executive branch cannot compel a renegotiation of a treaty or
executive agreement in the wake of a misguided precedent, and it
348
certainly cannot unilaterally change customary international law.
The executive branch nonetheless has a continuing obligation to
manage America’s relations with foreign states within the bounds of
the law. The consequence is that a judicial ruling on the nation’s
obligations under international law—or on the reciprocal obligations
of foreign states—entails distinct risks of compromising the special
349
need for a “single-voiced statement” in foreign affairs.
But here again, I return to a familiar theme: the concerns that
animate ex ante deference to the executive branch on matters of
international law do not evaporate once a court has in fact created a
precedent. Indeed, the executive branch’s continuing conduct of
foreign relations—including the practical performance of treaty
350
obligations and of practices relevant for customary international
351
law —may have a direct influence on the content of the law
notwithstanding a “final” precedent on international law. These
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792) (noting that under the Constitution, executive officers
are not authorized to sit on courts or to render judicial opinions).
347. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (emphasizing that the “collateral
consequences” of recognizing domestically enforceable torts for violations of international law
“should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 432–33 (1964) (noting the special role of the executive branch “as an advocate of
standards it believes desirable for the community of nations and protective of national
concerns”).
348. Substantial scholarly controversy exists over whether the president is bound by
customary international law at all. For an introduction to these debates, compare Michael J.
Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the
Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321 (1985), and Jordan J. Paust, The President Is
Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 377 (1987), with Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 4, and Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 1205 (1988). See also Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L
L. 930, 936–37 (1986) (arguing that the president may disregard customary international law for
purposes of American law only within his exclusive constitutional powers).
349. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“[Q]uestions touching foreign relations are
political questions. . . . [S]uch questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the
Government’s views. Yet it is error to suppose that every case . . . lies beyond judicial
cognizance.” (footnote omitted)).
350. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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legitimate executive-branch actions in the external realm represent a
further exogenous force of change that may work to erode the
foundations of a precedent. Adherence to the traditionally rigid
version of stare decisis would prevent ex post consideration of all of
these distinctive factors in foreign affairs.
By contrast, there is nothing unusual or particularly problematic
about judicial flexibility in a field of special executive authority. The
Supreme Court’s even more extreme approach in National Cable &
352
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services illustrates
the point. At issue in that case was the status of an administrative
agency’s interpretation of a statute subsequent to a contrary decision
353
by a federal court of appeals. The Supreme Court held, in applying
354
355
the Chevron doctrine, that stare decisis principles do not preclude
the recognition of a later agency interpretation, as long as the
interpretation is reasonable and is within the scope of the delegated
356
authority.
A similar perspective should inform the courts’ approach to
judicial precedents on international law. Some scholars advocate a
robust version of the Chevron doctrine for foreign affairs matters in
357
general. Whatever the merit of this broad proposition, nothing
about the judicial station in general or about the values served by
stare decisis precludes recognition of the continuing executive
influence in a particular field of law. And in no field is executive
authority more pervasive than in foreign affairs.

352. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
353. Id. at 982.
354. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
355. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (“In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in statutes
within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the
statutory gap in reasonable fashion.”). For recent examinations of the Chevron doctrine, see
generally Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676
(2007); and Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004).
356. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983 (“Neither Chevron nor the doctrine of stare
decisis . . . . preclud[es] agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous
statutes.”).
357. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 653
(2000) (explaining “why Chevron deference [to the executive branch’s interpretation of
international law] is not appropriate today”); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing
Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007) (“Drawing an analogy to the
administrative law doctrine of [Chevron], . . . courts should generally defer to the
executive[,] . . . . [and any] exceptions here are the standard exceptions to Chevron itself . . . .”).
But see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1230, 1236–45 (2007) (broadly rejecting enhanced judicial deference in foreign affairs).
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My analysis here is not a plea for judicial abdication. To the
contrary, the very existence of stare decisis fuels a pernicious
feedback loop of judicial reasoning on matters of international law.
Precisely because of inflated concerns about the lock-in effect of
precedent, the courts may defer to executive-branch desires as a
matter of ex ante routine. The executive branch, however, is a
358
political branch and is thus subject to shifting political preferences.
The strikingly different views of the Clinton and George W. Bush
administrations regarding the executive branch’s power to compel
359
compliance with a non-self-executing treaty prove this point starkly.
Unthinking acceptance of executive preferences also tilts the
lawmaking field decisively against Congress, for any attempt—even
by majorities in both houses—to displace a particular act of inflated
judicial deference would face a probable presidential veto and the
near-impossibility of an override by the required two-thirds majority.
For matters within the Article III mandate, the “province and
360
duty” of the federal courts to identify and enforce the law also
extends to international legal norms. The proper response to the
courts’ unease about treading on presidential prerogatives in foreign
affairs is not to surrender this essential judicial function to the
executive branch. The solution, as I explain in Part IV, is a more
accommodating understanding of stare decisis. The flexibility
inherent in this approach is fully consistent with the values that
animate the doctrine, but it is also appropriately sensitive to the

358. Even the Office of Legal Counsel has felt pressure from the executive branch to depart
from its own past legal opinions. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal
Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1483 (2010) (offering the example of the U.S. Postal
Service’s “attempt to persuade” the Office of Legal Counsel to “reconsider and rescind” a prior
opinion).
359. Reasoning that the treaty at issue, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, was
not self-executing, the Clinton administration informed the Supreme Court that the executive
branch did not have the authority to compel domestic enforcement. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214) (“The
‘measures at [the United States’] disposal’ under our Constitution may in some cases include
only persuasion . . . and not legal compulsion through the judicial system.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional
Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Apr. 9))). The administration of President George W. Bush took
the directly contrary view. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 51–53, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2006) (No. 04-5928) (asserting that the
decision to enforce international-law obligations through domestic law is within the unilateral
discretion of the executive).
360. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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judiciary’s special institutional station in the domestic enforcement of
international law.
IV. THE ANALYSIS DISTILLED: INTEGRATING STARE DECISIS AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
This final Part pulls together the various themes I have explored
to advance an argument for enhanced judicial modesty when
reviewing international-law precedents. Specifically, Section A
demonstrates that the distinctive considerations that attend judicial
action involving international law should function as additional
361
“special justifications” for revisiting the original and continuing
validity of a precedent in the field. Section B then explains why the
argument for increased flexibility toward precedents on international
law is especially compelling for the stare decisis practice of the federal
courts of appeals.
A. “Special Justifications” and Judicially Enforceable International
Law
Stare decisis does not admit of clean categories. It is a prudential
doctrine animated by pragmatic impulses about stability and system
integrity. Discerning the force of a given precedent involves weighing
these systemic values against situation-specific countervalues that
focus on the precedent’s original and continuing validity. In the end,
stare decisis functions as a simple preference for finality.
Extant stare decisis principles remain appropriate for purely
domestic statutes, as well as for derivative administrative
362
regulations. When a purely domestic legal norm defines the content
of the law without reference to international sources, faithful judicial
enforcement of the value judgments made by domestic authorities
avoids the fact, and should even avoid the appearance, of
independent judicial agency in foreign affairs lawmaking. Moreover,
the task of interpretation in such cases involves traditional and
familiar domestic source materials and institutional relationships.
Finally, as a matter of purely domestic law, all forces of subsequent
legal change are endogenous to the system and thus are within the
final judicial authority of the Supreme Court. In this context, it is
entirely appropriate for the courts to respect their own precedents

361. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
362. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
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and to leave future adjustments to the original source of the law:
363
Congress.
In matters of international law, by contrast, these special
considerations compel a more nuanced understanding of the proper
force of precedent. To be sure, the benefits of stability, predictability,
and judicial legitimacy support a prima facie respect for precedent in
international law as well as in domestic law. My analysis
demonstrates, however, that on questions of international law, the
justifications for adhering to judicial first impressions are inherently
weaker, and the potential grounds for reexamination are inherently
stronger. Specifically, I have argued that both the likelihood and the
consequences of judicial error are greater, that judicial precedents are
particularly susceptible to rapid erosion by exogenous forces of
change, and that institutional considerations make judicial leadership
particularly problematic.
Nevertheless, the special considerations that affect internationallaw precedents by no means constitute an all-purpose trump card.
That is, they do not represent an open-ended invitation to the courts
to engage their own predilections and pursue situational justice free
from concerns about the implications of precedent. Rather, these
special considerations should function as one significant weight on the
scale—one additional argument in the nature of a stare decisis
364
antivalue. To use the vernacular of the doctrine, they may alone
365
constitute a “special justification” for reexamining a precedent.
Even with this new “special justification,” the requirement of
actual, demonstrated justifications will remain for deviations from
international-law precedents. For one thing, not all matters of
international law are infected with uncertainty. One might think here
of an unambiguous provision in a bilateral treaty that finds consistent
support in secondary interpretive materials. In such a case, the values
of stability, predictability, and judicial legitimacy would continue to
support adherence to precedent.
In general, newly discovered information and evidence of
developments exogenous to America’s domestic system will present
363. Under Brand X, an administrative agency also may have a limited power to reinterpret
a statute within the scope of the authority delegated by Congress. See supra notes 352–56 and
accompanying text.
364. See supra Part I.C.
365. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (“Departure
from precedent is exceptional, and requires ‘special justification.’” (quoting Rumsey, 467 U.S. at
212)); supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
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the most compelling grounds for revisiting a precedent. Some judicial
decisions in the field, however, will tread on the prerogatives of the
366
political branches more directly. As a result, reexamination will be
especially appropriate for precedents that define the nation’s formal,
sovereign obligations under international law. By contrast, for
international law governing purely private legal relations—such as
367
private-law treaties —courts may properly demand convincing
evidence of subsequent developments to justify revisiting a precedent,
especially if counterbalanced by significant private reliance
368
interests. More generally, a consensus may coalesce, even around
delicate and ambiguous issues, through the accumulation of
experience and consistent judicial interpretation over time.
This analysis suggests as a guide the civil-law notion of
369
jurisprudence constante —or its cousin in German law, ständige
370
Rechtsprechung. The idea in this Article is that even without a
formal doctrine of stare decisis, the attractive force of a particular
precedent increases as courts consistently accept and apply it in later
cases. The parallel to American law’s own notion of stare decisis is
apparent. The significant difference, however, is that formal respect
for precedent does not attach to the first judicial intuition on a
subject; rather, it arises through consistent reaffirmation after
reflective reexamination over time. And, significantly, this approach
is decisively informed by a respect for the lawmaking prerogatives of

366. See supra notes 298–302 and accompanying text.
367. An example is the growing class of commercial-law treaties, such as the U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. For a broad examination of the
interpretive approach of these private-law treaties, see generally Michael P. Van Alstine,
Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1998).
368. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. Private reliance interests, however, may
become less convincing as divergences create jurisdictional uncertainty and, thus, the
opportunity for forum shopping.
369. See SongByrd, Inc. v. Bearsville Records, Inc., 104 F.3d 773, 776–77 (5th Cir. 1997)
(describing “jurisprudence constante” in Louisiana civil law); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v.
FitzGerald Contractors, Inc. (In re Whitaker Constr. Co.), 439 F.3d 212, 224–25 & n.12 (5th Cir.
2006) (same).
370. See Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Precedent in the Federal Republic of Germany, in
INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS, supra note 242, at 17, 50 (“A line of precedent has a much greater
weight than a single case. A line of precedent that has been established for some time is called
‘permanent adjudication’ (ständige Rechtsprechung).”).
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the legislature, and thus by the principle that judges fundamentally
371
are law finders, not lawmakers.
Similar sentiments are appropriate in America’s federal courts
when they create precedents on international law. The spirit of stare
decisis should remain. It simply must be calibrated in light of the
special contextual and institutional considerations that obtain in the
372
field.
Control over the reexamination of a particular precedent,
however, should remain solely with the Supreme Court, or with a
later panel of the same appellate court, as described in more detail in
373
Section B. In other words, the flexibility advocated in this Article
would affect only horizontal stare decisis. Vertical stare decisis would
continue to require adherence to precedent by lower courts to the full
374
extent of the existing law. This dimension thus would continue to
secure the values of stability and predictability advanced by a
hierarchically integrated judicial system.
Careful reflection also reveals that this perspective echoes
certain threads of existing stare decisis doctrine. Extant jurisprudence
recognizes that subsequent factual and legal events may undermine a
375
precedent. What courts and scholars have not fully appreciated,
however, is that in matters of international law, change of this
nature—perhaps rapid and significant change—is baked into the
376
system. In a separate vein, some persuasive observations of the
Supreme Court suggest that a less rigorous standard should apply
when the courts take the lead in lawmaking, such as with “judge377
made” procedural rules or federal common law created pursuant to
371. See Zenon Bankowski, D. Neil MacCormick, Lech Morawski & Alfonso Ruiz Miguel,
Rationales for Precedent, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS, supra note 242, at 481, 482–85
(examining this foundation for the civil-law approach to precedent).
372. Of course, the flexibility I advocate in this Article would not affect the normal res
judicata principles that apply to a final decision in a specific case.
373. See infra Part IV.B.
374. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (declaring that if a Supreme Court
precedent applies, “the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving
to th[e] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”).
375. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
376. For the rare instances in which scholars have recognized that the special attributes of
international law might affect the force of stare decisis in the field, see supra note 5.
377. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816–17 (2009) (rejecting application of
“the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress” with respect to
“judge made” procedural rules); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (contrasting the
strong stare decisis effect for property and contract-rights cases with its effect for cases
“involving procedural and evidentiary rules,” for which “the opposite is true”).
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378

delegated authority from Congress. The argument for flexibility is
even more compelling in matters of international law, an area in
which judicial leadership propelled by enhanced discretion is both
more pervasive and more consequential.
In light of these considerations, the lock-in effects of precedent
involving international law are particularly problematic. Judicial error
involves impermissibly enlarging or narrowing the rights or
obligations that govern the nation’s legal relations with foreign states.
And as I have shown, the practical hurdles to override by the political
branches are considerable. The one recognized categorical distinction
in stare decisis jurisprudence justifies a weaker version of the doctrine
for constitutional matters precisely because of the difficulty of
379
override by other constitutional institutions. A more relaxed
understanding of precedent on international law would accommodate
these special institutional considerations. That understanding would
enable—but not require—the courts to reexamine the original and
continued propriety of their leadership and also to consider even
informal expressions of intent from Congress and the president in the
future.
Finally, an enhanced openness to reexamining international-law
precedents would strengthen the institutional position of the
judiciary. A nuanced form of stare decisis frees the courts from the
binary trap of supine deference to the executive ex ante or inflexible
adherence to precedent ex post. The executive branch indeed has
special responsibilities in foreign affairs. But demanding consistency
across administrations when the executive makes claims to judicial
deference, at least in the absence of compelling reasons for change, is
no affront to the executive’s status in this field. The first
administration to weigh in should not have the final word on the
content of the law.
Modesty and flexibility in this sense are thus empowering. An
express recognition of the special considerations that affect the
authority of international-law precedents would empower the courts

378. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007) (stating
that “[s]tare decisis is not as significant” for the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006), because
“[f]rom the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute”). As
Professor Eskridge explains, the rationale for this approach is that when Congress delegates
lawmaking discretion through such statutes, the courts “should also be given the leeway to
experiment and overrule prior interpretations in a common law fashion.” Eskridge, supra note
67, at 1378.
379. See Martinez, supra note 5, at 486 (suggesting a similar point).
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to make independent decisions with a flexibility that would permit,
but would not require, reexamination of the foundations and
consequences of their actions in such an important field. In short, the
flexibility advocated in this Article reserves to the courts their field of
institutional expertise, leaves room for appropriate executive-branch
influence, and does not force on the legislative branch a task of pure
interpretation for which it is ill suited.
B. Local Courts, International Obligations: The Special Demands for
Stare Decisis Modesty in the Federal Courts of Appeals
It is curious that the Framers structured the Constitution to
protect against divergent interpretations of the nation’s international
380
legal obligations by the disparate state courts but that, in practice,
the vast bulk of this work is done by independent and geographically
381
segmented lower federal courts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly

380. The leading case on this point is Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816). In that case, a treaty case, the Supreme Court warned that if it lacked final judicial
authority to review divergent judgments and “harmonize them into uniformity,” federal law
“would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same
construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states.” Id. at 348.
381. The original conception was strikingly different. In the founding era, international-law
matters that could affect national authority—especially treaties—were under the mandatory,
final control of the Supreme Court. Until 1875, the federal district courts did not have general
federal question jurisdiction. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 127, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (granting
general federal question jurisdiction). Until that time, state courts did the bulk of the work on
treaty matters and related federal matters. The Judiciary Act of 1789 thus provided for direct
appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from final state court judgments. Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87. The same statute granted final control to the Supreme Court on
nearly all matters relating to foreign ambassadors or public ministers and to admiralty, the other
principal international-law issues of the day. See id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77 (granting district courts
jurisdiction over admiralty cases); id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . shall have
exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public
ministers . . . .”). Through a series of statutes enacted between 1868 and 1925, however, the
unifying force of this control declined dramatically. See Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44
(requiring Supreme Court Justices to ride circuit); Act of Mar. 3, 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26
Stat. 826 (creating circuit courts of appeals); Judiciary Act of 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (instituting
discretionary Supreme Court review of treaty cases); Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726
(limiting the Supreme Court’s appellate authority to cases in which a state high court declared a
treaty invalid); Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (giving appellate jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court (1) as of right, in cases in which a state high court declared a treaty invalid, and
(2) via petition for certiorari, in cases in which a state high court questioned a treaty’s validity).
Upon the creation of the circuit courts of appeal in 1891, Congress removed the right of direct
appeal from district courts to the Supreme Court for treaty issues. Evarts Act § 5, 26 Stat. at
827–28.
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emphasized the demand for national uniformity in this field. But as
Justice Scalia caustically observed in 2004 in specific reference to
international law, “[T]he lower federal courts [are] the principal
383
actors; we review but a tiny fraction of their decisions.” The facts
richly bear out this observation: Over 99 percent of the appellate
treaty cases in the first decade of the 2000s were decided by the
384
federal circuit courts. A broader study by Professor David Sloss
385
finds a similar percentage in the period from 1970 through 2006.
The principal cause of this phenomenon is the fact that in nearly
all matters of federal law, litigants have an appeal as of right to the
386
387
federal circuits. By contrast, since the Judiciary Act of 1925
eliminated appeals as of right from the circuit courts, even on treaty
388
issues, effectively all appellate judgments are subject only to
389
discretionary review by the Supreme Court. The practical effect of
this system is that the independent, geographically dispersed courts of
appeals provide the final judicial voice on nearly all matters of
390
international law.
Few would argue that these regional appellate courts represent
an effective medium for ensuring uniform fidelity to the international
382. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)
(observing that “federal uniformity is essential” in foreign commerce); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (declaring that national interests “imperatively require[] that federal power in
the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference”).
383. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750–51 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
384. A search of the Westlaw database reveals that of 1380 appellate opinions on the
interpretation of treaties in the first decade of the twenty-first century, only 6 were from the
Supreme Court.
385. This survey revealed only thirty-eight Supreme Court treaty cases between 1970 and
2006. During the same time period, over 3200 lower court opinions referenced treaties. David
Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT, supra
note 205, at 504, 514–17.
386. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (providing for this right, except in matters within the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and in the rare case in which
“direct review may be had in the Supreme Court”).
387. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
388. See id. sec. 1, §§ 237, 240, 43 Stat. at 937–39 (defining the scope of review for circuit
courts). For a comprehensive review of the growth of discretionary Supreme Court review since
this statute, see generally Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649–1704 (2000).
389. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (providing that decisions of the courts of appeals may be reviewed
by a writ of certiorari or by certification).
390. To be sure, a split in the circuits is one ground for discretionary Supreme Court review.
SUP. CT. R. 10(a). But the evidence cited in this Section, see supra notes 384–85, amply
demonstrates that even on the important subject of international treaties, the Court grants
certiorari in only about 1 percent of cases.
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legal obligations of the United States. The problem, however, is even
more acute than it might seem. Nearly all of the precedents in the
federal circuit courts come from panels—not from the entire circuit
court sitting en banc. The reason for this fact is the so-called law-of391
the-circuit doctrine. Under this doctrine, which controls in every
392
federal circuit, a precedent created by a single, randomly assigned
three-judge panel is immediately and absolutely binding throughout
the circuit. In the rare case in which a subsequent panel misses the
393
message, later panels are obligated to follow the first precedent.
391. For an analysis of stare decisis doctrine at the appellate court level, see generally Amy
Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317
(2005).
392. The Fifth Circuit’s summary in 2009 aptly captured the general approach. See United
States v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706, 709 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009) (“One panel of this Court may not overrule
the decision of a prior panel in the absence of en banc consideration or a superseding Supreme
Court decision.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010)
(acknowledging that “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until
it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court
sitting en banc”); State Bar of Cal. v. Findley (In re Findley), 593 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[T]hree judge panels of our Circuit are bound by prior panel opinions ‘unless an en banc
decision, Supreme Court decision or subsequent legislation undermines those decisions.’”
(quoting Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994))); Mendiola v. Holder,
585 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We may not overrule another panel of this court.”);
United States v. Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Only the court en banc may
overrule circuit precedent, subject to a limited exception in the case of an intervening Supreme
Court decision that is inconsistent with circuit precedent.”); United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47,
58 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]his panel is bound by prior decisions of this court unless and until the
precedents established therein are reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court.”); Peralta v.
Holder, 567 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[P]rior panel decisions are binding upon newly
constituted panels in the absence of supervening authority sufficient to warrant disregard of
established precedent.” (quoting Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2009))
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A
panel of this court is under another constraint: we must adhere to the law of our circuit unless
that law conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court.”); Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 430
(6th Cir. 2009) (“The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent
decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court
sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.”); Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 303 (4th
Cir. 2009) (rejecting an argument because the present determination was bound by an earlier
decision); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d. 694, 704–05 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It
is well settled in this Circuit that a three-judge panel may not overrule a decision by an earlier
panel.”); In re Skupniewitz, 73 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A panel decision is binding on
another court panel unless overruled with the approval of the en banc court.”).
393. See McMellon v. United States, 387 F. 3d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that “when
there is an irreconcilable conflict between opinions issued by three-judge panels of this court,
the first case to decide the issue is the one that must be followed”); Darrah v. City of Oak Park,
255 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “when a later decision of th[e] court conflicts with
one of [its] prior published decisions, [it is] still bound by the holding of the earlier case”); Ryan
v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 198–99 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen two decisions of this court conflict, we
are bound by the earlier decision.”).

VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

STARE DECISIS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1/25/2012 8:15 PM

1019

This doctrine is severe indeed. It prohibits reexamination of the
first panel’s precedent even in light of subsequent insights from other
394
circuits. The Eleventh Circuit declared this point bluntly in 2000:
“The fact that other circuits disagree with [our] analysis is
395
irrelevant.” To be sure, the possibility of en banc review remains;
but even this option by rule is “not favored and ordinarily will not be
396
ordered.”
To present the point starkly, consider a hypothetical case in the
Ninth Circuit. A panel majority may create a precedent on the
international legal obligations of the United States that is binding on
the entire circuit. This scenario would mean that a decision by two
judges would control a circuit of over sixty million people—nearly 20
percent of the country’s entire population. The precedent would be

394. See United States v. Coffey, 350 Fed. App’x 85, 86 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(rejecting the appellant’s argument because, “notwithstanding any reasoning that the prior
panel may not have considered and holdings from other circuits to the contrary, th[e] panel
[wa]s bound by [the prior panel’s] holding”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,
460 F.3d 515, 542 n.32 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]lthough another Circuit’s views are entitled to due
weight by our Court, they are not ‘intervening authority’ that would justify our reconsideration
of our precedents without en banc review.”), vacated on other grounds, 551 U.S. 1129 (2007); In
re Yates, 287 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he three judge panel before which this appeal is
currently pending has no authority to overrule [a previous case].”), rev’d on other grounds, 541
U.S. 1 (2004); United States v. Thompson, 234 F.3d 74, 78 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (providing that an
earlier decision may not be modified by a panel, even in light of subsequent developments);
Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e do
not believe that the circumstances exist for a panel to change the decision of the previous panel
and that that subject is better addressed by an en banc court.”); Bell v. Hill, 190 F.3d 1089, 1093
(9th Cir. 1999) (applying a holding rejected by other circuits because “a prior decision from [the
Ninth Circuit could] only be revisited by a three-judge panel if it ha[d] been undermined by an
intervening Supreme Court decision”); United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 16 n.16 (2d Cir.
1999) (“We are bound, however, as a panel of this court to follow the clear precedent of our
circuit.”); Garcia v. United States, 22 F.3d 609, 612 n.11 (5th Cir. 1994) (providing that a panel
may not overrule previous panel decisions); United States v. Splawn, 963 F.2d 295, 295–96 (10th
Cir. 1992) (noting that “a three-judge panel cannot overrule circuit precedent”). Only the
Seventh Circuit has suggested a bit more flexibility. See United States v. Carlos-Colmenares, 253
F.3d 276, 277–78 (7th Cir. 2001) (overruling a panel precedent after circulating the opinion to all
active members of the court on the basis that all other circuits had arrived at a contrary
conclusion).
395. In re USA, 624 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC
v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 623 n.15 (11th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
396. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). As Professor Amy Sloan observes, the rigidity of the law-of-thecircuit principle has spawned a variety of procedures for “informal en banc review.” Amy E.
Sloan, The Dog that Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713 passim (2009). Even these procedures are
rare, however, and ultimately might have problematic consequences for the rule-of-law
principles at the foundation of stare decisis. See generally id. (exploring the relationship between
stare decisis and informal en banc review).
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impervious to subsequent review within the circuit—except through
en banc review—and impervious to subsequent analyses by other
circuits. The law-of-the-circuit doctrine thus effectively precludes the
resolution of intercircuit conflicts on international law except in the
rare circumstance of en banc review or the even rarer event of
Supreme Court review.
The result is a very real possibility of a localized patchwork of
judicial declarations on the nation’s rights or obligations under
international law. The drama of the directly conflicting
pronouncements of the federal circuit courts over whether
corporations may be held liable for international human-rights
397
violations bluntly proves this point. To put it mildly, such a system is
discordant with the “‘concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings
with foreign nations’ that animated the Constitution’s allocation of
the foreign relations power to the National Government in the first
398
place.”
The rigid stare decisis practice of the federal circuit courts also
precludes consideration of the exogenous forces of change that are of
399
special significance for international-law precedents.
And the
overlay of divergent decisions of other appellate courts may make
these forces even more potent. In spite of this difficulty, the law-ofthe-circuit principle operates as a nearly absolute bar to examination
of subsequent developments in fact and law, the factors that the
400
Supreme Court deems to be “[o]f most relevance” for reexamining
a precedent.
Moreover, the great bulk of lower court precedent is generated
without the expertise of, and beyond the attention of, national
institutions. It is no slight to observe that with their large, mandatory
dockets, these courts may lack the necessary resources, expertise, and

397. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011)
(declaring that “if the board of directors of a corporation directs the corporation’s managers to
commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse ambassadors, or use slave labor, the corporation can
be civilly liable” under customary international law); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303,
1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that corporations are not immune from liability under customary
international law). But see Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“[C]ustomary international law does not impose liability against corporations . . . .”); Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that corporations cannot be
held liable for human-rights violations under customary international law).
398. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)).
399. See supra notes 231–43 and accompanying text.
400. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007).
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international perspectives to appreciate fully their special
responsibilities when they first confront a difficult issue of
401
international law. Unlike the Supreme Court, the sheer volume of
cases in the circuit courts constrains access to executive-branch
402
expertise, except on rare issues of national significance. And unlike
the certiorari filter for the Supreme Court, the federal courts of
appeals may not defer decisions on sensitive issues to await higherquality information, better lawyers, or increased attention by national
403
experts. These challenges counsel against overconfidence in a first
judicial attempt at a solution and thus recommend an increased
openness to reexamining the factual and legal foundations of initial
judicial impressions on matters of international law. And given the
significance of judicial declarations on the international legal
obligations of the United States, lower federal courts should not
content themselves with the quality of arguments, factual and legal,
presented by the lawyers who happen to appear before them the first
time.
Unfortunately, ample evidence suggests that the federal
appellate courts in fact are not fully sensitive to the “responsibility of
404
[their] stations” on such matters. As I have explained elsewhere, for
example, it is not uncommon for lower courts to retreat to familiar
local—and often idiosyncratic—interpretive techniques and
405
substantive concepts to construe international treaties.
This
categorical error has led to the misguided observation by some circuit
courts that “[t]reaties are construed in much the same manner as
406
statutes.” Another example comes from the courts’ widespread
401. See supra notes 254–63.
402. As a matter of simple volume, a search of the Westlaw database for the first decade of
the 2000s reveals that, as compared to 110 Supreme Court opinions, over 10,000 lower federal
court opinions mention the words “treaty” or “international law.” Of those lower court
opinions, only approximately 150 refer to an amicus brief by the “United States” or the
“executive branch.”
403. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006) (providing that in nearly all matters, the Supreme
Court reviews lower court decisions only by deciding to grant a petition for writ of certiorari),
with 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (providing that the federal courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions” of the district courts (emphasis added)).
404. Cf. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821) (observing that the Justices
felt “the responsibility of [their] stations” in the enforcement of treaties).
405. See Van Alstine, supra note 223, at 1936–42 (using, as an example, a Seventh Circuit
case that “retreated from” international precedent in favor of “the domestic law of the State of
Illinois,” ultimately reaching a conclusion contrary to international precedent).
406. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1999); see also
Sacirbey v. Guccione, 589 F.3d 52, 66 (2d Cir. 2009) (approving this statement); Collins v. Nat’l
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failure to honor the Supreme Court’s directive that domestic courts
should give “considerable weight” to the judicial opinions of treaty
407
partners. Of the nearly 1400 appellate treaty cases in the first
decade of the twenty-first century, only 12 even mentioned the views
408
of the courts of “sister signatories.”
Nonetheless, the consequences of regional precedents on
international law may be as significant as a Supreme Court decision
would be; the consequences are certainly as significant within the
affected circuit itself. And whether it recognizes or rejects a binding
norm of international law, an appellate court is formally participating
in the definition of international law. For this reason, the
constitutions of some countries have reserved the power to make
binding declarations on such subjects to a supreme court. A special
jurisdictional provision in the German Grundgesetz, for example,
requires lower courts to refer issues of customary international law to
the German Constitutional Court if they are unsure about the legal
409
issues.
In short, the case for judicial modesty on the force of stare decisis
with respect to matters of international law is even more compelling
410
for the federal courts of appeals. For such matters, the federal
circuits should explicitly relax the law-of-the-circuit doctrine to
permit later panels to consider subsequent legal and factual

Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (declaring that similar principles apply
for interpreting treaties and statutes). As noted, the Supreme Court’s loose rhetoric in SanchezLlamas v. Oregon seems to support this point. See supra note 227. For both a treaty and a
statute, interpretation “begins with [the] text.” Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010)
(quoting Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Beyond this obvious point, however, the Supreme Court throughout its history has emphasized
that fundamentally different principles apply to the interpretation of international treaties. See
supra Part III.A.
407. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
408. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010). The parameters of the corresponding
search of the Westlaw database are available from the Duke Law Journal. For a positive
counterexample involving customary international law, see United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp.
2d 599, 635–36 (E.D. Va. 2010).
409. See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic
Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 100(2) (Ger.) (providing that if doubt arises over whether a
rule of international law is part of federal law or over whether it directly creates rights and
obligations for individuals, a lower court must refer the matter to the Federal Constitutional
Court).
410. State supreme courts should adopt the same policy in the relatively rare cases in which
they create international-law precedents for lower state courts. See, e.g., State v. SanchezLlamas, 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005) (applying a treaty in a state criminal proceeding), aff’d, 548
U.S. 331 (2006).
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developments, the views of later courts, and the input of the executive
411
branch. The result, granted, will be more numerous expressions of
agreement or division among appellate panels. But on particularly
sensitive issues, this dialogue will also more rapidly attract attention
at the national level, whether from the executive branch or from the
Supreme Court, and will at least create pressure for regional
uniformity through en banc review.
Again, however, vertical stare decisis should remain. To secure
the essential benefits of stability and predictability, the power to
reexamine precedent should remain solely with later appellate panels,
412
not with the district courts. Nonetheless, by relaxing horizontal stare
decisis, the courts of appeals will enhance the quality of their
precedents by permitting reexamination founded on improved
information and insight. At the same time, this empowering flexibility
would limit the unavoidable consequence of fragmented, localized
judicial leadership in the identification of the nation’s legal
obligations under international law.
CONCLUSION
The field of foreign affairs, with its “important, complicated,
413
delicate and manifold problems,” fundamentally is not the province
of the judicial branch. Yet by express provision and structural
implication, the Constitution nonetheless requires the courts to
enforce a variety of legal norms that have direct implications for
foreign relations. For these matters as well—to return to the
foundational pronouncement of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison—it remains “emphatically the province and duty of the
414
judicial department to say what the law is” and, by extension, to
create precedent in the process. This immense judicial responsibility
is only expanding as international legal norms assume increasing
significance for the law and policy of the United States.
Unfortunately, the traditional stone-carving tools of stare decisis
are ill suited to the dynamics of this modern reality. In the expanding
field of domestically enforceable international law, the unavoidable

411. The First Circuit has left the door ajar, albeit only slightly. See United States v. Chhien,
266 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2001) (indicating that a panel precedent may yield “in extremely rare
circumstances, where non-controlling but persuasive case law suggests such a course”).
412. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
413. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
414. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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consequence of increased judicial discretion is increased judicial
leadership on issues at the core of the nation’s formal legal relations
with foreign states. Moreover, the unfamiliar and evolving
environment both increases the risk of initial error and compromises
the power of a precedent to secure finality. The message of the
analysis in this Article is that the courts should take to heart their
own ex ante admonitions about improvident judicial action as they
assess the ex post force of their initial impressions in this sensitive and
dynamic field of law.

